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INTRODUCTION
A single woman uses an anonymous sperm donor to have a
child. She spends hours poring over his file at the sperm bank,
learning intimate details like his favorite color and his grandmother’s medical history. She becomes pregnant with this donor and gives birth to a baby boy; the donor is not the boy’s father. By contrast, a different single woman has a one-night
stand with a man whom she met only hours before; she barely
remembers his eye color, let alone his name. She, too, becomes
pregnant with this man and gives birth to a baby girl; the man
is the girl’s father.
A married couple uses a fertility specialist to facilitate conception through alternative insemination. The husband, a
chronic liar and adulterer, provides the specialist with a vial of
semen; the specialist inseminates the wife without first testing
the semen for communicable diseases like HIV. By contrast, a
single woman contacts a man who decides to advertise over the
Internet free alternative insemination services; they become
very close friends, sharing life histories and intimate personal
information. They pursue alternative insemination, but are
dismayed to discover that the government requires donations
between certain partners who are not “sexually intimate” to be
1
tested for communicable diseases like HIV. The testing is cost1. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.90(a)(2) (2012) (exempting from the Food and
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ly, so the man discontinues his services and the woman instead
contacts a sperm bank, buying semen that carries a hefty price
tag—$800.00 a vial—in large part because of the government’s
mandatory testing requirements for procreative partners who
are not “sexually intimate.”
A same-sex couple falls in love with an anonymous donor
from a sperm bank; the couple intends to purchase vials of his
semen within the year. To the couple’s disappointment, the
government passes a law banning anonymous sperm donation
in order to protect children’s right to know their genetic progenitors. The donor, who desires anonymity, retires from the
bank’s donor program, forcing the couple to choose a less desirable open donor. By contrast, a single woman has a child after
a one-night stand. When the child is eight years old she asks
her mother about her “father”; the woman tells her daughter
that she lacks any identifying information, including a name,
about him.
Some of these vignettes, like the first two, reflect laws that
apply today in most jurisdictions. Others, like the third, are
emblematic of proposed regulations of alternative reproduction
that several commentators, conservative and progressive alike,
2
support. All of them reflect and perpetuate this Article’s subject of critique: reproductive binarism, the belief that sexual
and alternative reproduction are essentially different in fact
and therefore deserve different treatment in law.
Reproductive binarism governs large swathes of intimate
3
and family life, from paternity determinations to the federal
4
regulation of gamete providers to the myriad proposed regulations of alternative reproduction that have surfaced in recent
5
years. Reproductive binarism sustained marriage discrimina-

Drug Administration’s mandatory testing requirements for human reproductive cells or tissue semen donations between “sexually intimate partner[s]” but
requiring testing for donations between non-intimate partners).
2. Progressive scholars have relied on reproductive binarism to justify
limits on alternative reproduction, see infra Part I.C., as have former opponents of same-sex marriage. See Courtney Megan Cahill, The Oedipus Hex:
Regulating Family After Marriage Equality, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 228
(2015) [hereinafter Cahill, Oedipus Hex].
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. For these proposed regulations of alternative reproduction, see infra
Part I.C. Many of these proposals and their potentially burdensome effects on
non-traditional procreators are also examined in Courtney Megan Cahill,
Obergefell and the “New” Reproduction, MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES (2016); Ca-
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tion against same-sex couples for nearly fifty years, until the
Supreme Court finally rejected it as unconstitutional in
6
Obergefell v. Hodges. It touches everyone and disciplines
many: men, whether gay or straight; women, whether straight
or lesbian; heterosexual couples; same-sex couples; sperm donors, both anonymous and known; transgender and cisgender
7
individuals; sexuals and asexuals. Reproductive binarism conflicts with existing and emerging constitutional values like procreative intentionality and familial autonomy and is predicated
on a cramped vision of sex and intimacy. Moreover, it is stubborn, persisting in many domains even as it is jettisoned in
others, and enjoys nearly universal support, uniting critics of
non-traditional families with those families’ allies. Conception
“the old-fashioned way, through sexual intercourse” is just different from alternative reproduction, a traditionalist commen8
tator argues. Sex and alternative insemination “are, in fact,
different, and different enough to satisfy any level of constitu9
tional scrutiny,” echoes a progressive family law scholar.
This Article challenges reproductive binarism on factual
and constitutional grounds and considers how the law might—
and why it should—operationalize a unitary system of reproductive regulation based on procreative intent rather than procreative mechanics. The product of the very law that rendered
10
alternative reproduction licit, the law’s sex/non-sex distinction
is factually questionable because it obscures the basic similarities that exist among all forms of procreation. But as this Article argues, the law’s reproductive binary is also constitutionally
hill, Oedipus Hex, supra note 2, at 192–99; Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1195–1230 (2016).
6. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (rejecting the procreation rationale for marriage prohibitions). The sex/non-sex binary’s role in sustaining marriage discrimination against same-sex couples will be discussed at greater length below. See infra Part III.A.2, Part IV.
7. For a rich discussion of the pervasive, and often privileged, status of
sex in American legal culture and the burdens that “compulsory sexuality”
places on asexuals, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 303 (2014).
8. Elizabeth Marquardt, One Parent or Five: A Global Look at Today’s
New Intentional Families, COMM’N ON PARENTHOOD’S FUTURE: INST. FOR AM.
VALUES 1, 23 (2011), http://americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/one_parent_or_
five.pdf.
9. Naomi Cahn, Do Tell! The Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1077, 1106 (2014) [hereinafter Cahn, Do Tell!].
10. Part II argues at greater length that the legalization of alternative
insemination in the 1970s is partly responsible for the law’s sex/non-sex binary. See infra Part II.C.
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deficient, particularly in light of constitutional norms relating
to intimate and family life.
The law’s sex/non-sex binary is a product of the belief that
the Constitution protects—if it protects any form at all—sexual
11
but not alternative procreation. That assumption, in turn, is a
12
product of sex exceptionalism and “intimacy essentialism.”
The law generally treats sex as unique, different not just in degree but also in kind from other species of conduct, and the law
13
of reproduction is no different. Moreover, the law essentializes
intimacy by assuming that it is—and ought to be—noncommercial, private, and dyadic rather than commercial, public, and polyadic. Reproductive binarism reflects and replicates
14
those same assumptions.
Reproductive binarism is also a product of history. Before
alternative insemination became legally recognized in the
15
United States in the 1960s and 1970s, courts, commentators,
doctors, and patients conceptualized it in sexual terms. Either
11. See infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
12. This Article borrows these terms from Adrienne Davis, who explains
opposition to polygamy, in part, on “intimacy essentialism.” Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2033 (2010).
13. See infra Part II.B.1.
14. For a discussion of how intimacy essentialism—specifically, the belief
that intimacy and commerce are distinctive domains—shapes contemporary
legal norms surrounding alternative procreation, see Martha M. Ertman, Unexpected Links Between Baby Markets and Intergenerational Justice, 8 L. &
ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 271, 274–79 (2014) [hereinafter Ertman, Unexpected
Links]; Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?: A New
and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?].
15. Before the 1960s, alternative insemination by donor was treated just
like sex: the donor was a legal father (even if he contracted out of legal
parenthood ex ante), the woman, if married, was treated as an adulterer, and
the child as illegitimate. See, e.g., Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Ill.
Super. Ct. 1954) (holding that a married woman inseminated with donor semen had committed adultery and that the child conceived with that donor was
illegitimate), appeal dismissed, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956). Starting in the 1960s
and continuing into the 1970s, states started to legally recognize alternative
insemination by donor by treating the husband, not the donor, as the legal father of any child that resulted from alternative insemination. See, e.g., People
v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (1968). In 1973, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws codified the trend in the states toward legal
recognition of alternative insemination by donor by adopting a Uniform Parentage Act that “expressly approved donor artificial insemination (at least by
married couples), designating the husband as the (only) father.” HENRY T.
GREELY, THE END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 47
(2016).
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16

they called it “adultery by doctor” and deemed the resulting
17
children “illegitimate,” or they followed certain protocols
18
whose aim it was to sexualize the procedure. Eventually, however, legislators and regulators legitimized alternative insemination by de-sexualizing it and by drawing a clear distinction
between sexual life creation and commercial/medical life creation. Reproductive binarism could very well be the living arti19
fact of that legal and cultural shift.
Simply because the law’s sex/non-sex binary can be explained, however, does not mean that it is beyond critique. Reproductive binarism is factually inaccurate, obscuring the basic
similarities that exist between sexual and alternative reproduction. Sexual and alternative reproduction are categories that
overlap with each other—in some cases perfectly so. Reproduction the “old-fashioned way” can be non-intimate, planned, and
assisted in ways ordinarily associated with “assisted” reproduction, and “assisted” reproduction can be intimate and unpredictable in ways typically associated with sexual reproduction.
In some instances, sexual and alternative reproduction are the
20
same thing.
Consider the first vignette above. Scholars who hew to a
sex/non-sex distinction assume that sexual and alternative reproduction warrant different legal treatment in part because
one is intimate and the other less so. But that all depends on
what one means by “intimate,” as there is greater “closeness” in
some ways between the non-sexual procreators in that story
than there is between those of the sexual variety. This Article
argues that the factors on which scholars rely to justify a dual
system of reproductive regulation—intimacy, familiarity, sex,
deliberation, control, predictability, and naturalness—are ultimately insufficient to sustain that system, not only because
they are vague and imprecise, but also because they could just
as easily describe one form of procreation as another.
Even if sexual and alternative reproduction were formally
distinct, the law’s sex/non-sex binary would still raise concern
as a matter of constitutional law. Neither the text of the Con16. Kara W. Swanson, Adultery by Doctor: Artificial Insemination, 18901945, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 591, 593 (2012).
17. Id. at 621.
18. Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A
Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1050 (2002).
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. See infra Part III.B.
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stitution, nor constitutional history nor doctrine, supports different legal treatment of sexual and alternative reproduction,
particularly different treatment that is predicated on sex
exceptionalism and intimacy essentialism. To the contrary,
constitutional norms relating to sex, marriage, procreation, and
family formation favor—indeed, mandate—similar treatment of
21
procreation regardless of the form that it assumes.
Recent gay rights jurisprudence is notable in this regard,
including marriage equality jurisprudence. That jurisprudence
decenters the privileged status that heterosexual intercourse
has long enjoyed in the law and champions the intentional
parenthood that alternative reproduction often makes possi22
ble. This Article draws from that jurisprudence to highlight
the normative and constitutional deficiencies of regulating the
practice of alternative reproduction in ways that undercut procreative intent and that discipline individuals’ attempts to “es23
tablish” a family. More radical still, this Article uses that jurisprudence to force the question of whether the law can ever
treat procreation differently depending on the acts that facilitate it. It not only asks how marriage equality might constrain
emerging proposals to regulate the practice of alternative reproduction, but also confronts an even bigger issue: whether
the sex/non-sex binary that disciplines kinship creation for everyone is sustainable.
Parts I and II of this Article are descriptive in scope. Part I
examines the law’s reproductive binary as it exists in judicial
decisions, state and federal legislation, and academic commentary, while Part II offers conceptual and historical reasons for
it. Parts III and IV, which move from the descriptive to the argumentative, critique the law’s sex/non-sex distinction on factual and constitutional grounds. Part III demonstrates that
sexual and alternative reproduction are overlapping categories
with common attributes; in so doing, this Part destabilizes the
position that sexual and alternative reproduction occupy the
extreme ends of a single reproductive continuum, and illustrates that in some cases, sexual and alternative reproduction
are, in fact, the same thing. Part IV contends that reproductive
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part IV.D.
23. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that
“the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right to marry, establish a family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of a state’s marital
laws”).
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binarism, unsupported by either constitutional text or history,
is in tension with existing and emerging constitutional norms
relating to sex, marriage, procreation, and family formation.
Part V reflects on what the law might look like in the absence
of the sex/non-sex binary; it offers a unitary model of reproductive regulation grounded in intent (rather than form) and anticipates (and responds to) possible objections to that model.
I. REPRODUCTIVE BINARISM AND THE LAW
From paternity determinations to the federal regulation of
sperm banks to proposed regulations of alternative reproduction, the overwhelming trend in the law is to treat sexual procreation differently than its alternative counterpart—often on
the assumption that intimacy exists in the first context but not
in the latter. Sections A–C consider each of those bodies of law.
Some important exceptions to this general trend of differential
treatment exist, however, and Section D briefly considers them.
A. STATE REGULATION OF PATERNITY
A sex/non-sex binary drives paternity determinations in
American jurisdictions where the question has been ad24
dressed. States vary significantly with respect to who constitutes a donor or a father when individuals or couples use either
known or anonymous donors to conceive children through al25
ternative reproductive means. States vary not at all, however,
with respect to the legal status of donors who help unmarried
women to conceive through a sexual act: in all states, that donor is a father, regardless of the intentions of the parties and

24. See Lauren Gill, Who’s Your Daddy?: Defining Paternity Rights in the
Context of Free, Private Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1715, 1738
n.153 (2013) (listing these jurisdictions).
25. Some states still follow the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) of 1973,
which provides that donors are not legal fathers if they provide semen to a
physician for inseminating a married woman who is not the donor’s wife. See
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973); Gill, supra note 24, at 1738 & n.151. Other states follow the revised Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 (amended in 2002),
which provides that no donor will be considered a parent of any child that results from his donation, regardless of the marital status of the recipient and
regardless of whether the insemination involved a physician. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000) (amended 2002); Gill, supra note 24, at 1738 &
n.152. Comments to the amended UPA clarify that the married woman requirement “is not realistic in light of present ART practices and the constitutional protections of the procreative rights of unmarried as well as married
women.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (2000) (amended 2002).

2016]

REPRODUCTION RECONCEIVED

625

regardless of whether or not a written non-paternity contract
26
existed between them.
Subsection 1 examines the reproductive binary that drives
state paternity determinations of sexual inseminators. Subsection 2 examines the reproductive binary that drives state paternity determinations of alternative inseminators. Subsection
2 demonstrates that reproductive binarism has influenced even
the regulatory approach to alternative insemination, with more
intimate donations tending to result in fatherhood and less in27
timate donations tending to avoid that legal status.
1. Sexual Insemination
No court has ever recognized a waiver of paternity where
an unmarried woman intentionally conceives a child with a
28
man through sexual intercourse. For instance, in Straub v.
B.M.T., the Indiana Supreme Court refused to uphold a written
pre-conception contract between a man and a woman who
agreed to conceive a child through sexual intercourse rather
29
than through alternative insemination. In addition to rejecting the legal possibility of “artificial insemination by inter-

26. See generally Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology?: The History
and Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 22–23 (2004) [hereinafter Baker, Bargaining]; Katharine K. Baker,
Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 701
(2008) [hereinafter Baker, Bionormativity] (stating that American law has
“never allowed men and women to agree to waive parental status before or after the intercourse that led to conception”). The revised UPA makes clear that
the term “donor” applies only to assisted reproduction and therefore does not
include someone who helps to create a child through sexual intercourse. See
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 (2000) (“This [article] does not apply to the birth
of a child conceived by means of sexual intercourse”).
27. It is important to highlight at the outset that more intimate donations
(including sexual donations) tend to result in fatherhood if the recipient female is unmarried. If she is married to a man other than the donor, then the
marital presumption of parenthood may trump the law’s tendency to impose
fatherhood in sexual/intimate donation settings. For cases where the marital
presumption trumped the sexual conception paternity rule, see Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d
798 (Pa. 2012).
28. Of course, the fact that no court has ever found non-paternity in a situation involving sexual conception between a man and an unmarried woman
does not mean that such sexual insemination cases do not exist. Donor insemination by intercourse has been discussed in the media. See infra note 259. In
addition, Quebec, unlike the United States, recognizes sexual sperm donation,
but gives the sperm donor one year from the birth of any child to change his
mind and assert legal paternity. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
29. 645 N.E.2d 597 (Ind. 1994).
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30

course,” the court reasoned that pre-conception contracts
predicated on sex violated public policy because “sexual inter31
course as consideration is itself against public policy.” In addition, the Straub court found that the agreement at issue in that
case failed to adhere to the requisite formalities that sometimes
32
apply in the alternative insemination context, including the
“physician involvement” requirement that obtains in some
33
34
states as well as under the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act.
35
Similarly, in Kesler v. Weniger, a trial court in Pennsylvania refused to uphold an alleged oral agreement between a
woman and a man, the latter of whom agreed to inseminate the
former sexually on condition that he would not have any legal
obligations with respect to any child or children that might result. Like the Straub court, the Weniger court “decline[d] to
recognize a category of ‘artificial insemination by inter36
course,’” reasoning that child support “cannot be bargained
away before conception any more than it can be bargained
37
away after birth.”
Other courts have similarly drawn an explicit sex/non-sex
distinction when discussing when a donor becomes a father,
reasoning that where “conception [takes] place by intercourse,
38
there [is] no question that the ‘donor’ [is] the father.” For these courts, the notion that sexual intercourse results in paternity is so obvious as to defy explanation. As the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania recently remarked, the “distinction between reproduction via sexual intercourse and the non-sexual clinical
39
options for conception” —two “extremes of an increasingly
40
complicated continuum,” in the court’s words —is a matter of
30. Id. at 601.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 601 n.10.
34. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973).
35. 744 A.2d 794 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
36. Id. at 796.
37. Id.
38. C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, 824 (N.J. Super. 1977); see also Estes v.
Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607, 609 (S.D. 1993) (rejecting the argument that a man
was a sperm donor to a woman with whom he conceived a biological child
“naturally” rather than “artificially”).
39. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1245 (Pa. 2007) (upholding
oral agreement between mother and donor that relinquished the latter’s rights
and responsibilities over any children that resulted from in vitro fertilization
with the donor’s sperm).
40. Id. at 1246.
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41

simple “commonsense.” This distinction was on clear display
42
in In re Paternity of M.F., a 2010 Indiana paternity case which
held that a man could be the legal father of a child whom he
sexually conceived with the biological mother but not of a different child whom he alternatively conceived with that same
43
person.
The law’s treatment of the status of men who sexually conceive with unmarried women by design tracks its treatment of
the status of men who sexually conceive with unmarried women by accident: the latter cohort, as the law in every state
makes clear, cannot avoid the obligations of fatherhood, even if
44
the legal mother agrees to a waiver of paternity. In addition,
the law’s treatment of “insemination by intercourse” tracks its
treatment of men who become fathers as the result of an underlying sexual act to which they never consented, as when a
45
pregnancy results from statutory rape of a male by a female or
46
from non-consensual sex between two adults. It also tracks
the law’s treatment of men whose sperm is “misappropriated”
by women and used by them to self-inseminate (without the

41. Id. at 1245.
42. In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
43. The In re Paternity of M.F. court found non-paternity with respect to
the child whom the man conceived through alternative insemination for three
reasons. First, the man and the woman, despite a prior sexual relationship (or
at least encounter) that led to the conception and birth of the woman’s other
child, had conceived the second child through alternative, not sexual, means.
Id. at 1260. Second, the man and the woman had a Donor Agreement, prepared by an attorney, that “reflect[ed] the parties’ careful consideration of the
implications of such an agreement and a thorough understanding of its meaning and import.” Id. at 1261. Third, the man and the woman used a physician
in the alternative insemination process. See id. at 1260.
44. See Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 26 at 701 (stating that American law has “never allowed men and women to agree to waive parental status
before or after the intercourse that led to conception”).
45. See, e.g., L.M.E. v. A.R.S., 680 N.W.2d 902 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Cty
of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4th 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996);
Kansas ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); Mercer Cty.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Imogene T. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1992).
46. See, e.g., State v. Daniel G.H. (In re Paternity of Derek S.H.), No. 010473, 2002 WL 265006 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2002) (imposing paternity on a
man even though he was the alleged victim of non-consensual sexual intercourse); S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996)
(imposing paternity on a man whose fatherhood resulted from an act of sexual
intercourse in which he allegedly engaged while unconscious on the ground
“[t]he child is an innocent party, and . . . any wrongful conduct on the part of
the mother should not alter the father’s duty to provide support for the child”).
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men’s consent) following an act of consensual oral sex or who
were misled about the woman’s use of contraception or ability
47
to conceive. Conception between men and unmarried women
that is the product of some sexual act, it turns out, whether
consensual or not and whether by design or not, results in paternity. As one court put it, “some sort of sexual contact” between unmarried women and unwilling men that results in
conception is enough to justify the imposition of paternity on
48
those men.
At first blush, it appears that courts’ refusal to recognize
paternity waivers in sexual insemination cases between unmarried women and men originates in a desire to steer those
individuals into units that resemble the traditional, nuclear
family (mother, father, and children) and to guarantee that
49
children have two parents to financially support them. But if
re-creating the traditional family were the law’s paramount
concern, then why do most states recognize non-paternity in a

47. See Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579 (Ill. App. Ct.
Feb. 22, 2005) (rejecting a man’s claims of fraudulent misrepresentation and
conversion against a woman with whom he had consensual oral sex and who
allegedly used his semen without his consent to be inseminated); Wallis v.
Smith, 22 P.3d 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting a man’s claims of fraud,
breach of contract, conversion, and prima facie tort against a woman who
falsely claimed she was using contraception and became pregnant); State v.
Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032, 1035–36 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (imposing paternity on a
man whose semen was allegedly used without his consent to inseminate a
woman with whom he had consensual oral sex); Moorman v. Walker, 773 P.2d
887, 888–89 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting a man’s misrepresentation claim
against a woman who allegedly claimed she was infertile and became pregnant); In re L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 713–15 (N.Y. 1983) (imposing paternity on a man notwithstanding the lower court’s finding that the
mother intentionally deceived the father as to her use of contraception).
48. Frisard, 694 So. 2d at 1036.
49. In Straub, for instance, the court analogized the sexual insemination
contract at issue there, where a man attempted to contract out of paternity
before having sex, to situations where fathers have attempted to contract out
of child support obligations after a child has come into being. Straub v. B.M.T.,
645 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ind. 1994). As the court remarked: “Neither parent has
the right to contract away . . . support benefits. The right to the support lies
exclusively with the child.” Id. Similarly, in Weniger the court dismissed the
sexual donor’s contention that his “role” was “merely that of a man obliging a
friend with donations of sperm,” declaring that “the right to support is a right
of the child, not the mother or father. It cannot be bargained away before conception any more than it can be bargained away after birth.” Kesler v.
Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). On the surface, then, the
courts in both of these cases appeared more concerned with channeling individuals into traditional—and financially stable—family units than with the
procreative mechanics that were at issue in each of them.
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large number of non-sexual donation cases involving men and
single women? “[I]mmunity from child support obligations is
never available in cases of sexual conception,” Susan Frelich
Appleton writes, but often available in cases of alternative con50
ception.
In addition, ensuring that children are financially supported by two parents is not always the principal driver of paternity
rules. Consider in this regard cases where courts have permitted men to disestablish paternity when their wives become
pregnant through sexual conception with another man but not
when those wives become pregnant through non-sexual conception with anonymous sperm—even when those husbands have
been raising children for years and where financial support
from a “new” father is uncertain. In one such case, a court suggested that if a married woman effectively cheats on her husband with a syringe—by being artificially inseminated without
his consent—then he will still be the father of the child if he
51
consents ex post.
If, however, a married woman cheats on her husband
through coitus, then her husband will never be the father of a
child that results, even if he consents ex post by assuming the
duties of fatherhood and even if financial support is not forth52
coming from the child’s “natural” father.
53
That case and at least one other like it suggest that the
mode of conception, beyond a desire to protect the financial in-

50. Susan Frelich Appleton, Between the Binaries: Exploring the Legal
Boundaries of Nonanonymous Sperm Donation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 93, 108–09
(2015).
51. See Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160, 1169 (D.C. 1993) (reasoning that
“[t]he manner of conception is significant for estoppel purposes”). The father in
Dews had assumed the responsibilities of parenthood over the child in question for ten years before attempting to disclaim paternity and thereby avoid a
child support obligation. Id. at 1164–66. Moreover, the husband knew the entire time that his son was not biologically related to him. Id. Nevertheless, the
court concluded, the doctrine of estoppel could not be raised by the husband’s
wife in order to defeat his non-paternity claim because of the manner in which
conception occurred: coitally rather than artificially. Id. at 1168.
52. As the court stated in a footnote: “We emphasize . . . that the availability or unavailability of other resources [for the child] cannot affect the rights
of Mr. Dews or of other husbands in his situation.” Id. at 1169 n.12.
53. The Dews court’s logic has been echoed by other courts in analogous
contexts. See In re Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ill. App. 1998)
(reasoning that courts ought to distinguish between “artificial insemination
and insemination by another man” when determining whether a man ought to
be estopped from denying paternity and rejecting a mother’s estoppel claim
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terests of children, is driving determinations of fatherhood in at
least some contested paternity cases, regardless of the marital
54
status of the mother. Recall also In re Paternity of M.F., the
Indiana Court of Appeals paternity case discussed above.
There, a sexually conceived child was protected through child
support from the legal father whereas a child alternatively conceived with the sperm of that same man (and living in the same
55
household as the other child) was not.
Like these decisions, the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)
draws a clear distinction between sexual and non-sexual donations. The UPA was originally passed in 1973 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Conference) to provide a uniform parentage law for children born to
married and unmarried persons; the Conference has amended
the UPA twice since that time. Article 1 of the current UPA defines “donor” as someone who “produces eggs or sperm used for
56
assisted reproduction” and defines “assisted reproduction” as
“a method of causing pregnancy other than sexual inter57
course.” In addition, Article 7 of the Act, which deals with
children of “assisted reproduction,” provides that “[t]his [article] does not apply to the birth of a child conceived by means of
58
sexual intercourse.” The Comment section for Article 7 explains that “a child conceived by sexual intercourse is not covered by this article, irrespective of the alleged intent of the par59
ties.” As with decisional law, a dividing line between paternity
and non-paternity for the UPA is sex.
2. Alternative Insemination
Not unlike the role that it plays in the legal regulation of
sexual insemination, reproductive binarism also informs, at
least historically and to some extent today, the question of paternity in the alternative insemination context. To be sure,
state variation exists on the question of when an alternative inseminator constitutes a father and when he remains a donor.
That said, a look at these regimes suggests that even within
because the child in question, whom the mother’s husband raised for ten
years, was the result of a sexual affair rather than of alternative conception).
54. 938 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
55. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
56. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2002) § 102(8).
57. Id. § 102(4) (emphasis added).
58. Id. § 701.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
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this spectrum of possibilities there exists a binary of sorts: in
some states more intimate donations result in paternity and
less intimate donations avoid that legal status.
Of the states that have a statute addressing alternative insemination, some, like Oklahoma and Georgia, make it illegal
to engage in that method of conception without a physician’s
60
61
assistance. Others, like the 1973 UPA, require the presence
of an intermediary—either a physician or a licensed sperm
62
bank—in order for a donor to avoid paternity. Jurisdictions
that require physician assistance appear to be motivated, at
least in part, by reproductive binarism and its distinctions between intimate (sexual) and non-intimate (alternative) reproduction.
63
For instance, in Kansas ex rel. J.L.S. v. W.M., a court imposed paternity on a man who helped a woman and her female
partner to become parents through alternative insemination
but without physician assistance, as Kansas parentage law re64
quires in order for donors to remain donors. Notwithstanding
the fact that the mother and the donor had a written agreement waiving paternity, the court imposed paternity on the do-

60. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-37 (2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553
(West 2012).
61. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973) (“If, under the supervision of a
licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is
treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”
(emphasis added)).
62. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.20.045 (West 2012); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7613(b) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f ) (2015); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 257.56 (West 2012).While California’s Parentage Act requires a third-party
intermediary (doctor, surgeon, or licensed sperm bank) in order for a donor to
avoid paternity, the Act allows donors and donees who fail to use physician
assistance to contract out of paternity either orally or in writing. See CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7613(b)(2). Some of these states follow the 1973 UPA rather than
the revised UPA, which discarded the physician assistance requirement as
well as the requirement that the recipient of donor sperm be married. The revised UPA did not, however, discard the requirement that the donation be “assisted” rather than “sexual” in order for the donor to avoid legal paternity. See
supra notes 25–26.
63. Case No. 12D-2686 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Shawnee Cnty., Jan 22, 2014),
http://www.shawneecourt.org/DocumentCenter/View/468.
64. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f ) (2015) (“The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other
than the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the birth father of a
child thereby conceived, unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the
woman.” (emphasis added)).
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nor—over the objection of all the parties involved —because he
and the mother failed to satisfy the physician assistance requirement. Reading Kansas parentage law strictly, the W.M.
court reasoned that Kansas decided to “limit the application of
the donor non-paternity provision to instances in which semen
66
is provided to a licensed physician.” For that reason, the court
concluded, the donor was a father, with all of the rights and re67
sponsibilities that status entails.
The W.M. court relied in large part on a prior California
68
decision, Jhordan C. v. Mary K., where a court applied a law
similar to the Kansas parentage statute—but which has since
been repealed and replaced with a different parentage stat69
ute—to impose paternity on a donor who was seeking it. Like
the law at issue in V.M., the law at issue in Jhordan C. required donors to use physician intermediaries in order to main70
tain their donor status. Because the donor at issue there provided semen to an unmarried woman and her “close [female]
71
friend” without using a physician intermediary, the court held
72
that he was a father rather than a donor.
Reproductive binarism appears to play a role in these cases
and in the laws on which they rest. More intimate donations
(without physician assistance) result in legal paternity, whereas less intimate donations (with physician assistance) do not.
While neither of the above-mentioned cases explicitly says so, it
could be that Kansas (and formerly California) requires third65. The state in W.M. was suing the donor after the child’s mother had
applied to the state for financial assistance. W.M., Case No. 12D-2686, at 2–5.
By the time the W.M. decision was handed down, the mother and her by then
former partner had submitted a parenting plan that included provisions for
private financial support of the child. Id. The mother’s former partner had not
adopted the child in question, but intervened in the action to establish her legal right to the child. W.M. was therefore not a case where the court imposed
paternity simply in order to ensure dual financial support of a child. Id. at 6.
66. Id. at 9.
67. See id.
68. 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (Ct. App. 1986).
69. The law at issue in Jhordan C., CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b), was repealed in 2005 and replaced by the law that currently governs assisted reproduction. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2012). The old law absolutely required physician assistance of some kind in order for donors to avoid paternity
in situations involving unmarried women. The new law also imposes paternity
in the absence of physician assistance, but allows the parties to contract
around that rule either orally or in writing. See supra note 62.
70. See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 391–92.
71. See id. at 388.
72. See id. at 397.
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party assistance in the assisted reproductive context in order to
render assisted conception sufficiently non-intimate to distinguish it from sexual conception. Under this view, physician assistance quite literally de-familiarizes the mechanics of concep73
tion—as well as the donor who helps to facilitate it. As Part II
argues, the history behind the physician assistance requirement supports this theory, as states, like the 1973 UPA, implemented the requirement in the 1970s in an effort to draw a
clear distinction between intimate/sexual life creation and non74
intimate/non-sexual life creation.
To be sure, there could be other reasons aside from reproductive binarism for states like California and Kansas to have
these requirements. One reason, the Jhordan C. court speculated, “relates to health: a physician can obtain a complete
medical history of the donor (which may be of crucial importance to the child during his or her lifetime) and screen the
75
donor for any hereditary or communicable diseases.” The second reason relates to clarifying the intentions of the parties.
“The presence of a professional third party such as a physician,” the Jhordan C. court explained, “can serve to create a
formal, documented structure for the donor-recipient relationship, without which, as this case illustrates, misunderstandings between the parties regarding the nature of their relationship and the donor’s relationship to the child would be more
76
likely to occur.”
But a closer look at both Jhordan C. and W.M. casts doubt
on these rationales. The law at issue in Jhordan C. effectively
required physician assistance for unmarried women only, as a
separate provision—the paternal presumption—made it impos73. It is important to note that reproductive binarism does not characterize all states’ approach to paternity determinations in the alternative reproductive setting. For example, while some states require physician assistance
either for alternative insemination to be legal or for a donor to remain a donor,
many states, like the contemporary UPA, have dispensed with the requirement entirely. As Appleton observes, the physician assistance requirement has
started “to fade.” Appleton, supra note 50, at 113. Thus, even as reproductive
binarism undoubtedly plays a role in the law of sexual donation, and appears
to play a role in the law of alternative reproduction in some states, its influence over the legal regulation of alternative reproduction is not universal.
That said, it is important to scrutinize the motivations behind even past manifestations of reproductive binarism in order to better grasp what might be animating its contemporary forms.
74. See infra Part II.C.
75. Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 393.
76. Id.
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sible for a donor to gain legal paternity if he failed to use a physician in the alternative insemination process with a married
77
woman. If California were principally concerned with health
and safety, then presumably the physician assistance requirement would have applied across the board. Similarly, the parties in W.M. had a written agreement memorializing their intent; indeed, they had the kind of “formal, documented
78
structure for the donor-recipient relationship” that Jhordan
C. speculated was the reason for a physician requirement. Even
so, the W.M. court still found that the donor was a father rather
than a donor simply because he and the donee did not satisfy
the physician assistance requirement.
The under-inclusiveness of these rationales as applied in
these cases suggests that reproductive binarism and its presumptions about intimacy is (or in California’s case, was) motivating jurisdictions to impose the physician assistance requirement. Other states attempt to ‘de-familiarize’ assisted
79
conception in even stranger ways. In Bruce v. Boardwine, a
Virginia court last year held that a man was a father rather
than a donor simply because a woman used a turkey baster rather than a medical instrument to get pregnant with his semen.
The narrow issue before the Boardwine court was a question of
statutory interpretation: whether turkey baster insemination
qualified as “assisted conception” under Virginia law, which
treats men who facilitate conception through “intervening med80
ical technology” as donors rather than fathers. According to
that law, “intervening medical technology” includes “but is not
limited to, conventional medical and surgical treatment as well
as noncoital reproductive technology such as artificial insemi81
nation by donor.”
Ruling in favor of the man, who was seeking paternity, the
Boardwine court reasoned that “[a]n ordinary kitchen implement used at home is simply not analogous to the medical
technologies that are listed in [Virginia’s assisted conception
statute], nor does it constitute a ‘reproductive’ technology under

77. Id. at 395. The donee in Jhordan C. argued—unsuccessfully—that
California’s alternative insemination law violated the Federal Equal Protection Clause by making an impermissible distinction between married and unmarried women. See id.
78. Id. at 393.
79. 64 Va. App. 623 (2015).
80. See id. at 629.
81. Id.
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82

the plain meaning of the term.” For a man to retain donor status in Virginia, then, he must inseminate a woman with a qualifying “medical instrument” rather than with an “ordinary”
domestic appliance like a turkey baster. Unlike Kansas and
other states, Virginia does not require men and women to use a
human intermediary in order to avoid paternity. But like Kansas and other states, it does require them to de-familiarize assisted conception in some way in order to achieve the same result.
B. FEDERAL REGULATION OF SEMEN PROVIDERS
Federal regulation of semen providers reflects and reproduces a procreative binary that privileges sexual reproduction
and relies on a narrow view of what sexual reproduction
means. According to 21 C.F.R. § 1271, which sets forth the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations that apply to establishments, like gamete banks, that
manufacture human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissuebased products, an “establishment” that “manufactures” human
products like (and including) semen is subject to extensive—
and expensive—testing requirements, including testing for
83
communicable diseases like HIV and cytomegalovirus. Section
1271 exempts from these requirements donations that will be
transferred to a “sexually intimate partner,” or “SIP,” of the
84
semen donor. So, for example, if a man provides semen to a
fertility provider—a qualifying “establishment”—in order to inseminate his wife with medical assistance, then the provider
need not test the man’s donation, as that donation will be
transferred to a presumed SIP, the man’s wife.
85
Although Section 1271 nowhere defines the term “SIP,”
the FDA has recently applied it in a way that suggests that its
exclusive meaning is a woman who is in a monogamous relationship with a man that involves sexual intercourse. In 2010,
the FDA applied Section 1271’s requirements to Trent Arsenault, a private sperm donor from San Francisco who had been
donating semen to women since 2006 without the help of a
sperm bank or fertility doctor, and on an uncompensated ba82. Id. at 631.
83. 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2012).
84. Id. § 1271.15(e).
85. See Amber D. Abbasi, The Curious Case of Trent Arsenault: Questioning FDA Regulatory Authority over Private Sperm Donation, 22 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 1, 37 (2013).
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86

sis. Mr. Arsenault, whose donations led to at least twenty-five
conceptions and eighteen live births, advertised his services on
87
the Internet through the website trentdonor.org. While Mr.
Arsenault was not a sexual sperm donor—he offered the individuals who procured his services in-person pickup of his semen at his house—he argued that he and his clients constituted “sexually intimate partners” who qualified for the statutory
88
exemption for SIPs.
In 2012, the FDA Commissioner disagreed. Upholding a
previous FDA “Order to Cease Manufacture” of semen that was
directed at Mr. Arsenault, the Commissioner refused to accept
Mr. Arsenault’s “expanded definition of the term ‘sexually intimate partner,’” arguing that to do so would undermine “the
89
protections offered by the donor eligibility requirements.” Under the Commissioner’s view, sexually intimate partners—
presumably monogamous couples engaged in traditional heterosexual intercourse, where the threat of sexually communicable
disease is ostensibly low—did not need such “protections” because their intimacy ensured transparency in matters pertain90
ing to sexual health; those engaged in less intimate donation
86. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Form 483 Inspectional Observations
Report (Sept. 20, 2010), http://trentdonor.org/trentdonor/d/21520-2/FDA-Form
-483-Inspection-Observations-TrentDonor-20-Sep-2010-5-Pages.pdf [hereinafter FDA Form 483].
87. See Abbasi, supra note 85, at 17–20. Mr. Arsenault’s website may be
accessed at http://www.trentdonor.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
88. See Letter from Trent Arsenault to Barbara Cassens and Mary Malarkey, Dirs., FDA (Nov. 1, 2010), http://trentdonor.org/sites/g2sites/
trentdonor/d/21459-4/trentdonor-fda-form-483-response-doc-01-nov-2010.pdf.
Mr. Arsenault has elsewhere referred to himself as a “donorsexual.” David
Moye, Trent Arsenault, “Donorsexual” Virgin Father of 14 Kids, Answers Your
Questions, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/02/03/trent-arsenault-donorsexual-sperm-donor-video_n_1251595.html.
89. Center for Biologics Evaluation & Research, Memorandum in Support
of CBER’s Motion to Deny Hearing Request and for Administrative Summary
Judgment 15, (Feb. 7, 2011), http://trentdonor.com/sites/g2sites/trentdonor/d/
21703-2/trentdonor-fda-motion-to-deny-hearing-07feb2010.pdf.
90. But the FDA assumes too much. Sexually intimate partners often lie
about their past and current sexual relations. A 2015 survey conducted by the
polling company YouGov found that twenty-one percent of men surveyed and
nineteen percent of women surveyed admitted that they had cheated; seven
percent of persons surveyed preferred not to respond. Sorting Through the
Numbers on Infidelity, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 26, 2015), http://www.npr.org/
2015/07/26/426434619/sorting-through-the-numbers-on-infidelity. In addition,
sexually intimate partners often are unaware of the communicable diseases
that they carry—diseases like Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, which the FDA lists
as one of the diseases for which non-sexually-intimate donors are tested. See
FDA Form 483, supra note 86, at 2. The human manifestation of “mad cow”
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settings, however, did. In effect, the Commissioner found that
Mr. Arsenault, a private sperm donor, was more like a commercial sperm bank than an individual in a relationship that sufficiently approximated traditional sexual intercourse to qualify
for the exemption.
91
Mr. Arsenault has not challenged the agency’s decision.
92
One of his donees, however, has—unsuccessfully. In Doe v.
Hamburg, a case filed in the federal district court for the
Northern District of California, the donee argued that the government’s refusal to apply the SIP exemption to her and Mr.
Arsenault’s relationship violated her constitutional rights to
93
privacy and autonomy. Her attorney, Amber Abbasi, has argued in both court filings and a law review article that the
FDA’s refusal to view private, non-coital sperm donation as
“sexually intimate” suggests that the FDA is using its regulatory power to “impos[e] its particular set of beliefs about the true
94
meaning of a procreative relationship” and to privilege a “sub95
set of sexually intimate relationships” : the relationships of a
“monogamous couple that regularly engage in sexual intercourse and do not take part in individual activities that could
96
lead to asymmetrical exposure.” In so doing, Abbasi maintains, the FDA regulations inflict myriad constitutional harms
on alternative procreators, including “serious harms to individ97
ual autonomy.”
disease, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease is a rare, degenerative brain disorder of
which its carriers are unaware until they are either tested or become symptomatic. See Creutzfeldt-Jackob Disease, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic
.org/diseases-conditions/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease/basics/definition/con
-20028005 (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
91. See Doe v. Hamburg, No. C-12-3412EMC, 2013 WL 3783749, at *4
(N.D. Cal. July 16, 2013) (stating that “[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Arsenault has since challenged the Commissioner’s decision”);
Moye, supra note 88.
92. See Hamburg, 2013 WL 3783749, at *1.
93. See id. at *4.
94. Abbasi, supra note 85, at 28; see also Jacqueline M. Acker, The Case
for an Unregulated Private Sperm Donation Market, 20 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1,
32 (2013).
95. Abbasi, supra note 85, at 27.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 28. Abbasi’s right to procreate claim posits that constitutional
protection for procreation is no less robust when life creation is “noncoital or
collaborative.” Id. at 34 (citing John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the
Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 429
(1982) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty]). Her equal protection ar
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In July 2013, the Hamburg court dismissed Jane Doe’s
complaint by invoking the logic of reproductive binarism and
its belief in the essential difference—in this case, the essential
constitutional difference—between intimate sexual reproduction and non-intimate commercial reproduction. The court dismissed the case on prudential standing grounds, finding that
98
“Ms. Doe asserts no independent rights personal to her.” Rather, the court continued, her rights were merely “derivative of
Mr. Arsenault’s.” The court dismissed as “specious” the plaintiff’s contention that “she has broader rights independent of
Mr. Arsenault’s which are violated, such as her general right to
99
procreate.” “Ms. Doe is not impeded from exercising any general constitutional right to procreate or even a more specific
100
right (if it exists) to procreate via artificial insemination,” the
court declared. To the contrary, it said, “[t]he only thing Ms.
Doe is deprived of is the right to have Mr. Arsenault’s child
specifically through a ‘commercial’ (i.e., nonintimate) relation101
ship.”
C. PROPOSED REGULATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE REPRODUCTION
Reproductive binarism informs numerous proposed regulations of alternative reproduction offered by conservative and
progressive commentators alike. Dov Fox, for instance, argues
that the government ought to discourage gamete banks from
arranging donors on their websites in race-based ways—by, for
instance, making it easy for users to filter donors based on
102
their racial or ethnic background —by imposing a sin tax or a
gument posits that there is no reasonable basis for distinguishing between
“artificial insemination” and “natural insemination,” the latter of which enjoys
complete shelter from the FDA’s regulatory gaze. Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief at 15, Doe v. Hamburg, No. C-12-3412EMC, 2013 WL
3783749 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2013). Finally, the First Amendment argument
posits that “[b]y refusing to accept an expanded definition of sexually intimate
partnership, the FDA has violated the First Amendment rights of intimate association of Ms. Doe, other similarly situated women, and willing male donors
with whom they have chosen to conceive children via artificial insemination.”
Id. at 15–16.
98. Doe v. Hamburg, No. C-12-3412EMC, 2013 WL 3783749, at *8 (N.D.
Cal. July 16, 2013).
99. Id. at *7.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. For an example of this practice, see Donor Search, CAL. CRYOBANK,
https://cryobank.com/Search (California Cryobank website) (last visited Nov.
3, 2016).
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commercial advertising ban on banks that engage in that “per103
Similarly, Naomi Cahn, David
nicious social practice[].”
Blankenhorn and others support laws eliminating gamete donor anonymity in order, among other reasons, to reduce the
104
possibility of “accidental incest” between donor-conceived kin.
Cahn also advocates mandatory caps on gamete donation that
would limit the number of families to whom a donor may do105
nate his or her gametes, as well as the establishment of special birth certificates for donor-conceived children that reveal
106
the biological origins of their conception.
In addition, several commentators support regulating the
practices of fertility providers no less than the practices of
gamete banks. Some call for limiting the number of eggs that
can be harvested from, and implanted in, a woman during any
107
single in vitro fertilization (IVF) cycle. At least one other,
103. Dov Fox, Note, Racial Classification in Assisted Reproduction, 118
YALE L.J. 1844, 1846 (2009) [hereinafter Fox, Racial Classification]; see also
Dov Fox, Race Sorting in Family Formation, 49 FAM. L.Q. 55 (2015) (criticizing this practice); Dov Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2011) [hereinafter Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race] (same) .
104. See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING
OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995); NAOMI CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP:
CONSTRUCTING DONOR-CONCEIVED FAMILIES 129 (2013) [hereinafter CAHN,
THE NEW KINSHIP]; DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006); Naomi
Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 413 (2012) [hereinafter Cahn, The
New Kinship]; Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835,
904 (2000) [hereinafter Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making]; David
Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES (June 22,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how/-my-view-on-gay
-marriage-changed.html. For a critique of the “accidental incest” argument in
favor of greater regulation of alternative reproduction, see Cahill, Oedipus
Hex, supra note 2, passim.
105. CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 104, at 160–61.
106. See Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9, at 1104–05. In Cahn’s view, these
reforms are necessary in order to prevent accidental incest between donorconceived children, respect donor-conceived children’s right to know the identity of their genetic progenitors, alleviate the transmission of hereditary diseases from donors to the offspring of unsuspecting donees, and respect the donorconceived community’s desire for familial connection. See generally CAHN, THE
NEW KINSHIP, supra note 104, passim.
107. See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, A View from the Cradle: Tort Law and the
Private Regulation of Assisted Reproduction, 59 EMORY L.J. 1039 (2010); Naomi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight Is Enough, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 501 (2009); Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1623 (2008). Multiple egg extractions risk not just the health of the
patient, these commentators argue, but also the health of her eventual offspring, who are exposed to a “plethora of medical problems” associated with
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Michele Goodwin, supports the private regulation of alternative
108
reproduction through the expansion of tort law. Goodwin
maintains that the law ought to regulate “reckless reproduc109
tion” no less than it regulates “reckless driving.” “When vile
externalities arise [from ART], including forcing children to
cope with irreversible disabilities that result from the odious
manipulation of reproductive specialists or the narcissistic
choices of their parents,” Goodwin argues, “there must be a
110
mechanism for addressing them.” That mechanism, she contends, is tort. “Much in the same way that the law recognizes
personal injury causes of action arising from the use of technology, such as cars, trains, and planes, so too should the law recognize personal injury actions in biotechnology and in ART in
111
particular,” she writes.
Many, if not most, of these proposals for regulatory reform
rest on reproductive binarism and its narrow conception of sex
and intimacy. For instance, in justifying why the government
ought to penalize race-conscious gamete banks but not race112
conscious dating websites—of which there are many —Dov
Fox draws a clear distinction between “intimate” romantic affiliation (which dating websites are intended to facilitate) and
“transactional” alternative reproduction. He says:
Autonomy interests are implicated differently in assisted reproduction . . . than they are in sexual reproduction or romantic dating. The
exchange of money for genetic material provides the means to produce
a child—a profoundly intimate act to which the donor contributes onehalf of the necessary raw materials. But the relationship between the
people who directly engage in that procreative act is characterized
less by intimacy than anonymity. What is present in the romantic
matching context that is missing in the reproductive matching context is meaningful interface between the parties on either side of the

high-order births, including “low birthweight, . . . cerebral palsy, other disabilities, and death.” Goodwin, supra, at 1052; see also id. at 1058 (discussing
complications from general anesthesia); id. at 1059–60 (discussing risks of
ovarian damage and ovarian cancer); Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1623, 1643 (2008) (recommending limits on embryo transplants).
108. See Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1043 (proposing a “paradigm shift”
that considers “the viability of tort law to address the private and costly harms
resulting from negligent application of ART”).
109. Id. at 1054.
110. Id. at 1071.
111. Id. at 1089.
112. For a discussion of these websites and their explicit racial preferences,
see Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Love and Sex, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1322 (2009).
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exchange. Prospective parents and sperm donors transact at arm’s
length through a corporate broker who does not ordinarily permit either party even to learn the name of the other, let alone to have interpersonal contact. The market in donor insemination mediates reproduction to eliminate the intimacy that both typifies the
relationship between consensual procreative partners, and also
grounds the associational autonomy interests at stake in the act of
procreation. Dating website [sic] deal in the union of people; sperm
113
banks deal in the union of gametes.

Fox’s distinction between intimate romantic affiliation and
transactional alternative reproduction typifies the foundational
assumptions that underlie many of the proposed regulations
114
discussed earlier. For instance, in response to the anticipated
criticism that her proposals for “donor-conceived” birth certificates treat “donor-conceived children differently from children
created through sexual reproduction,” Cahn writes that “[t]he
reality is that they are, in fact, different, and different enough
115
to satisfy any level of constitutional scrutiny.” While “[e]ven
children conceived through a one-night stand involve a sexual
encounter,” she continues, “donor-conceived children require
the involvement of someone outside the family, a third party
who is not within the protected sphere of sexually intimate
116
conduct.”

113. Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1882–83 (footnotes omitted); see also Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, supra note 103, at 10–11 (discussing why racially limited dating websites are markedly distinct from racially limited sperm banks).
114. In a forthcoming article on the tort of reproductive negligence, Professor Fox appraises the differences between sexual and alternative reproduction
in less stark terms. Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For instance,
when suggesting that constitutional protection for procreation might not necessarily act as a bar to recovery for reproductive negligence by third-party
providers of a variety of reproductive services, Fox says: “Constitutionally protected interests in romantic intimacy may also lose some of their purchase
when procreation moves from bedroom to laboratory, as do interests in bodily
integrity in the absence of physical harm or unconsented touch.” Id. (emphasis
added). Under this view, “romantic intimacy interests” are attenuated, but not
eliminated, when procreation moves from bedroom to doctor’s office. Id.
115. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9, at 1106.
116. Id. Elsewhere in that article, Cahn distinguishes between “donor conception” and traditional conception not only by giving the former a different
name—“donor conception”—but also, like Fox, by juxtaposing the presumed
intimacy of sexual conception against the presumed non-intimacy of alternative reproduction. Id. In “donor-conception cases,” Cahn argues, “[a]t least one
legal parent (and there may only be one) has made a deliberate choice to use a
third party, unlike in other types of biologically-formed families, when children are created through intimate acts.” Id. at 1117 (emphasis added).

642

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:617

Similarly, Blankenhorn and his colleagues at the Institute
117
for American Values posit a factual distinction between alternative reproduction—and the “intentional parenthood” that
it helps to facilitate—and reproduction “the old-fashioned
118
way,” as does Goodwin, who rests her proposals for invigorating tort law to cover a broader field of alternative reproductive
technology cases on an explicit distinction between alternative
and traditional procreation. While conceding that parents gen119
erally “do not owe children a promise of perfection,” Goodwin
argues that parents who turn to reproductive technologies
might be penalized for their actions in a way that “natural”
procreators cannot (or should not) be. She says: “[T]he key
question here is the distinction between natural reproduction
and clinical or assisted reproduction, which are distinctly dif120
ferent.”
As with the regulations discussed above, these proposed
regulations of alternative reproduction flow from three interrelated assumptions. First, they assume that sexual procreation
and alternative reproduction involve factually distinct lifecreating mechanisms. Second, they assume that “natural” life
creation is intimate in a way that “commercial” life creation is
not. Third, they assume that these differences regarding mechanics and intimacy justify different legal treatment of traditional and alternative reproduction, as well as the imposition of
burdensome restrictions on alternative procreators.
D. EXCEPTIONS TO REPRODUCTIVE BINARISM IN THE LAW
Exceptions exist with all general trends, and that is no less
the case with the legal treatment of sexual and alternative reproduction. This Section briefly considers instances where

117. The Institute for American Values (IAV) is a public policy think tank
that aims to “renew civil society and end the culture wars” based, in part, on
the most pressing social issues of a given time. INST. FOR AM. VALUES, http://
www.americanvalues.org/about (last visited Nov. 3, 2016). Founded (and led)
by David Blankenhorn, a former opponent of same-sex marriage and the “star
witness” for Proposition 8’s proponents in the federal trial over that amendment’s constitutionality, the IAV is critical of non-traditional parenthood for
the same reasons that it once opposed same-sex marriage, namely because it
disrupts biological, dual-gender parenting. Frank Rich, Two Weddings, a Divorce, and ‘Glee,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
06/13/opinion/13rich.html.
118. MARQUARDT, supra note 8, at 23.
119. Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1091–92.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
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courts and commentators have treated sexual and alternative
reproduction the same (or have advocated the equal treatment
of them), thereby resisting the general legal trend of treating
procreation differently depending on the manner in which it occurs.
Some courts have treated sexual and alternative reproduction similarly in a line of prisoner reproduction cases, which
have held that the state does not violate a prisoner’s right to
procreate by denying him permission to procreate with his wife,
121
either through sex or alternative insemination. A few scholars have also treated alternative and sexual reproduction similarly, at least in some respects. John Robertson, for instance,
has argued that the constitutional right to procreate ought to
extend to a range of alternative reproductive technologies, including in vitro fertilization, alternative insemination, and sur122
rogacy. The infertile, no less than the fertile, he maintains,
have an “interest in genetic continuity, in gestating and giving
123
birth, and in rearing the offspring.” Insofar as the right to
bear and rear children protects those interests, Robertson contends, it makes little sense to withhold that right from one kind
124
of procreation but extend it to another.
Like Robertson, other scholars support parity of treatment
in some respects between sexual and alternative insemination,

121. See, e.g., Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (situating alternative insemination on the same plane as other constitutionally protected forms of intimate association, like sexual intercourse, that are “necessarily” curtailed in prison); Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (W.D.
Mo. 1988) (placing artificial insemination alongside other “intimate relationships [that] are severely infringed upon by the nature of incarceration”).
122. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND
THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994); John A. Robertson, Assisting
Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of Reproductive Freedom, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1505 (2008) [hereinafter Robertson, Assisting Reproduction]; Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 97, passim.
123. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 97, at 428.
124. See, e.g., Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, supra note 122, at 1505
(stating that “[o]ur developing conceptions of procreative liberty should extend
protection to gay and lesbian individuals and couples” because they “have the
same interests in having children that heterosexuals do, and can use ARTs to
achieve that goal” (emphasis added)); see also Lawrence Wu, Family Planning
Through Human Cloning: Is There a Fundamental Right?, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1461, 1487 (1998) (arguing that “[i]dentifying a ‘coital’ couple’s and a
‘noncoital’ couple’s procreative intent clarifies the similarities of the interests
involved, because upon close inspection, nothing materially differentiates the
content of one couple’s intent from another, except the absence of sex to
achieve procreation” (emphasis added)).
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although not for all of the reasons advanced here. Susan
Frelich Appleton, for instance, asks: “[W]hat reasons require
categorical rejection of a clear written, [sic] agreement of
nonparentage in [sexual conception] cases—like the contracts
125
courts accept for [alternative insemination]?” Similarly, Nancy Polikoff supports identical treatment of families “regardless
126
of the method of conception.” These scholars, however, repre127
“The much louder call,” Martha
sent “a minority view.”
Ertman writes, “is for states to meddle in [alternative]
128
parenthood” but not necessarily in its traditional version.
Finally, until the 1960s, law and society treated alternative insemination and sexual procreation analogously. An
American legal system reluctant to legitimize donor insemination rejected it by conceptualizing it in illicit sexual terms—as
129
“adultery by doctor” —and by characterizing its resulting off130
spring as “illegitimate.” Even users of alternative insemination viewed it during this time through a sexual lens, partly in
order to naturalize the procedure and thereby alleviate their
discomfort with the idea of severing the link between sex and
131
procreation. The historical conflation of alternative insemination and sexual intercourse is explained in greater detail below.
E. SUMMARY
This Part has surveyed the extent of the law’s dual system
of reproductive regulation. In addition to revealing the breadth
125. Appleton, supra note 50, at 113; see also MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S
PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL KINDS OF
FAMILIES 59 (2015) (arguing that “family law should honor people’s choices to
make whatever family arrangements they choose, as long as health and safety
are protected”); I. Glenn Cohen, Response: Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity: Of Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and One-Night Stands, 100 GEO. L.J. 431,
445 (2012) (criticizing Naomi Cahn’s regulatory proposals for implicitly conceding “that reproduction through [reproductive] technologies is a ‘lower status’ kind of reproduction, worthy of less protection”).
126. Nancy D. Polikoff, Breaking the Link Between Biology and Parental
Rights in Planned Lesbian Families: When Sperm Donors Are Not Fathers, 2
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 57, 59 (2000). Polikoff argues that the law ought to “provide a mechanism, for both children conceived coitally and those conceived
through donor insemination, facilitating recognition of the mother-child unit
as a family without a father, the same status accorded the family of a single
woman who adopts a child.” Id.
127. ERTMAN, supra note 125, at 60.
128. Id.
129. Swanson, supra note 16, at 593.
130. Id. at 621.
131. See infra Part II.C.
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of reproductive binarism in the law, Part I has shown how reproductive binarism is an equal-opportunity discipliner, imposing burdens on alternative procreators from which sexual procreators are exempt and vice versa. For instance, the supposed
intimacy that renders contractual bargaining unreliable in the
sexual conception context protects it from excessive governmental regulation. By contrast, the supposed lack of intimacy
that renders contractual bargaining reliable in the alternative
conception context exposes it to significant governmental med132
dling and interference. Parts III and IV will return to the relative hardships that reproductive binarism imposes on alternative as well as sexual procreators, and to the factual and
constitutional reasons why those hardships ought to provoke
our skepticism.
II. REPRODUCTIVE BINARISM EXPLAINED
Part I demonstrated the pervasive influence of reproductive binarism on family law and on the law of alternative reproduction. Part II now offers possible explanations for reproductive binarism, including constitutional, conceptual, and
historical explanations.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION
Reproductive binarism, particularly as it burdens alternative procreators, is in large part a product of the belief that alternative reproduction merits less constitutional protection
than sexual conception. Scholars who support alternative reproductive regulation often justify their proposals by centering
on the constitutional status of procreation in general and alternative reproduction in particular. They variously contend that
133
Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court’s “right to procreate” case that struck down a mandatory sterilization law on
134
equal protection grounds, “says little about the importance or

132. See Appleton, supra note 50, at 93–94 (discussing the burdens and
freedoms that the law selectively applies to sexual and alternative reproduction).
133. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
134. Because Skinner struck down Oklahoma’s involuntary sterilization
law on equal protection rather than on due process grounds, some—though by
no means all—scholars argue that it at most establishes an equality right in
procreative matters. See, e.g., Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1462
(2008). In Rao’s view, Skinner stands for the proposition that the state cannot
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value of reproduction or the right to reproduce,” says nothing
136
about whether that right includes alternative reproduction,
and at most prohibits the government from regulating alternative reproductive technologies in unequal ways—not from regu137
lating alternative reproductive technologies for everyone.
The constitutional explanation for reproductive binarism
offers only partial explanatory power. It explains why some
scholars are willing to tolerate regulation of one form of reproduction and not similar regulations of another, but fails to provide any insight as to why they believe that alternative reproduction is constitutionally inferior in the first place. To
understand the deeper logic of reproductive binarism (and the
constitutional arguments that support it) we must turn elsewhere: to the conceptual and historical reasons for the nearly
habitual belief that alternative and sexual conception are factually distinct, and therefore deserving of different constitutional and regulatory treatment.
B. CONCEPTUAL EXPLANATIONS
1. Sex Exceptionalism
Reproductive binarism reflects and replicates sex
exceptionalism: the belief that sex, defined in traditional heterosexual terms, is unique in a way that merits different, and often privileged, legal treatment. From the regulation of marriage and intimate agreements to the punishment of sex work,
single out particular groups (like gays and lesbians) when regulating alternative reproduction, but may regulate alternative reproduction for everyone.
Other scholars read Skinner as establishing a more expansive liberty right.
See Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, supra note 122, at 1493 (arguing that
“[a]lthough [Skinner] couched its decision in the language of equality . . . the
rhetoric of a liberty right to reproduce . . . explains the frequency with which
the case is now cited”).
135. Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1089.
136. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 424 (2012)
(“As a constitutional matter, the parameters of a procreative right concerning
assisted reproduction are less than clear.”); Fox, Racial Classification, supra
note 103, at 1882 (observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has not considered
whether autonomy or privacy rights encompass decisions involving the use of
assisted reproductive technologies”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right To Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 993–94 (2002).
137. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 134, at 1460 (“[T]he government could prohibit use of a particular reproductive technology across the board for everyone;
however, once the state permits use in some contexts, it should not be able to
forbid use of the same technology in other contexts. Hence, all persons must
possess an equal right, even if no one retains an absolute right, to use ARTs.”).
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sexual assault, and sex offenders, the law, like society generally, treats sex and sexual conduct as different in kind from other
varieties of conduct. Indeed, “[e]ven language itself holds sex in
high esteem: The phrase ‘make love’ stands in for ‘have sex,’ as
138
if it’s the only true way to express love,” a self-identified
asexual writes. Sex exceptionalism travels across multiple legal
domains and comprises two related aspects: (1) sex as different/unique; and (2) sex as special/privileged.
a. Sex as Different/Unique
The first aspect of sex exceptionalism—the belief that sex
is different or unique—guides family law’s treatment of marriage, and, in some cases, of non-marital intimate relationships.
While sex is not a requirement to enter into a marriage, it is a
basis for terminating one: one spouse’s inability or unwilling139
ness to engage in sex, specifically and narrowly defined, with
the other spouse is grounds for annulment in most jurisdic140
141
tions; in some jurisdictions, it is grounds for divorce. As one
commentator notes, “The validity of marriage is . . . contingent
upon the capacity of both partners to engage in complete sexual
142
intercourse,” and marriages might be annulled for failure to
consummate, regardless of whether fraudulent intent not to
143
consummate at the outset of marriage was present. Indeed,
“[t]he desire, or at least initial willingness, of both parties to
engage in sexual intercourse is considered so basic to mar144
that courts will refuse even to honor pre-marital
riage”
145
agreements that limit sexual intercourse during marriage, or

138. Kim Kaletsky, Asexual and Happy, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/05/fashion/asexual-and-happy.html?_r=0.
139. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(holding that a marriage between a man and a transgender woman who had
gender confirmation surgery was valid in New Jersey because the surgery
rendered her able to satisfy the essence of marriage with her husband: heterosexual coitus); Laurence Drew Borten, Note, Sex, Procreation, and the State
Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1089, 1099 (2002) (observing that
“courts have been quite narrow and excruciatingly precise in describing exactly what is meant by sexual capacity with respect to its consequence: the ability
of the husband to fully penetrate his wife without pain” (footnote omitted)).
140. Borten, supra note 139, at 1100–03.
141. Id. at 1122–23.
142. Id. at 1100; see also Emens, supra note 7, at 351.
143. Borten, supra note 139, at 1104–08.
144. Id. at 1103.
145. See, e.g., Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct. App. 1976).

648

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:617
146

that delay consummation for some time after marriage, on
the ground that such agreements interfere with the marriage
147
contract’s sexual essence.
As with remaining in (or entering into) marital and cohabitant relationships, family law treats sex as different/unique in
its posture toward cohabitant, or “Marvin,” agreements, which
148
courts tend to uphold unless they are predicated on sex. “The
law of contracts, in principle at least, prides itself on not looking inside the ‘black box’ of consideration—leaving it to parties
149
to place their own valuations on particular deals,” Emens
writes. “Sex is one notable exception to that general princi150
ple.”
Sex exceptionalism emerges in criminal law no less than it
does in family law. Some criminal incest prohibitions single out
not just sex between certain family members, but a remarkably
narrow definition of sex: penetrative sex between opposite-sex
151
persons. Criminal adultery statutes in some jurisdictions do
the same, defining the crime of adultery as not just sexual in-

146. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 150 N.E. 605 (N.Y. 1926).
147. For a more detailed discussion of these and other cases that consider
married couples’ attempts to contract around marriage’s sexual default rules,
see Borten, supra note 139, at 1106. As with marriage, sex is a defining attribute of domestic partnerships; thus, some jurisdictions require sex in order
to grant legal recognition to a domestic partnership. Emens, supra note 7, at
353 (noting that some domestic partnership regimes “appear to require sexual
consummation”).
148. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (holding
that cohabitation contracts were valid in California “unless expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of sexual services” (emphasis
added)).
149. Emens, supra note 7, at 356.
150. Id. Speaking to the potential effects that sex exceptionalism might
have on asexuals, Emens continues: “[T]reating sex as special under law may
do more than reflect the assumptions of a sexual society; rather, special legal
treatment for sex may reinforce the specialness of sex as a cultural matter.” Id.
151. For instance, Florida’s criminal incest statute provides that
“[w]hoever knowingly marries or has sexual intercourse with a person to
whom he or she is related by lineal consanguinity, or a brother, sister, uncle,
aunt, nephew, or niece, commits incest, which constitutes a felony of the third
degree.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 826.04 (West 2016). Florida defines “sexual intercourse,” in turn, as “the penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex
organ, however slight; emission of semen is not required.” Id.; see also Carnes
v. State, 725 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam) (stating
that “[t]he obvious purpose of the incest statute is to address the evil of sexual
intercourse between persons who are related to each other within specific degrees” (emphasis added)).
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152

tercourse but heterosexual coitus specifically. In addition, the
153
criminal laws in nearly every jurisdiction prohibit sex work
but allow equally “demeaning,” “intense,” and “tiring” work,
154
such as plucking chickens. They also “assign[] harsher penalties to unwanted [sexual] touching and other [sexual] interaction than non-sexual versions of those same interactions would
155
Finally, sex offenses—broadly conceived—inspire
trigger.”
singular disgust. “No other crime invokes such negative public
156
perceptions,” sociologists write.
b. Sex as Special/Privileged
The second aspect of sex exceptionalism—the belief that
sex ought to be privileged—flows directly from the first aspect.
Sexual harassment law exhibits this aspect of sex
exceptionalism by over-protecting individuals from certain sexual conduct and under-protecting them from non-sexual forms
157
of discrimination. Family law does so as well by assuming
that sex—unlike other conduct, like procreation—is essential to
the marital relation. Before the advent of no-fault divorce,
which made unilateral exit from marriage relatively easy, unilateral exit through annulment was permitted for those who
152. See In re Blanchflower, 434 A.2d 1010, 1012 (N.H. 2003) (holding that
under New Hampshire’s criminal adultery statute, “‘adultery’ excludes all
non-coital sex acts”).
153. Danielle Augustson & Alyssa George, Prostitution and Sex Work, 16
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 229, 232 (2015) (observing that “[p]rostitution is illegal
in every state, with certain exceptions in Nevada and, until November 2009, in
Rhode Island” (footnote omitted)).
154. Martha C. Nussbaum, “Whether from Reason or Prejudice”: Taking
Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 700–02 (1998).
155. Emens, supra note 7, at 356–57. While some commentators argue that
“the basic concept of rape as an independent and exceedingly heinous crime is
a form of paternalism, inseparable from antiquated notions of female chastity
and delicacy,” others maintain that the conventional view that “rape is a
uniquely devastating type of assault still seems to be valid.” David P. Bryden,
Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 433 (2000).
156. James F. Quinn et al., Societal Reaction to Sex Offenders: A Review of
the Origins and Results of the Myths Surrounding Their Crimes and Treatment Amenability, 25 DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 215, 217 (2004); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Sex Offender Exceptionalism and Preventative Detention, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969 (2011).
157. For sexual harassment law’s simultaneous under-protection/overprotection problem, see Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J.
2061, 2065 (2003) (“[T]he same focus on sexual conduct that has led courts to
ignore . . . larger patterns of sexism and discrimination is also leading companies to prohibit a broad range of relatively harmless sexual conduct, even
when that conduct does not threaten gender equality on the job.”).
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experienced sexual dissatisfaction. Such exit was not necessarily permitted, though, for those who experienced other species of
158
discontent.
c. Reproductive Binarism and Sex Exceptionalism
Sex exceptionalism underlies the sex/non-sex binary as
well as the laws, actual and proposed, that flow from it. For instance, the belief that sexual reproduction is both different
from and better than alternative reproduction animated laws
that excluded same-sex couples from marriage until just recent159
ly.
That same belief continues to animate the dominant legal
approach to alternative reproduction. Paternity laws treat sexual and alternative procreation differently by imposing fatherhood after sex but not necessarily after alternative insemination, and the FDA privileges sex by exempting donations
between “sexually intimate partners,” narrowly conceived, from
its mandatory testing requirements. Similarly, all of the proposed regulations considered earlier assume essential differences between sexual and alternative reproduction, one presumptively intimate and the other presumptively non-intimate,
and privilege sexual conception by suggesting that it ought to
be entitled to greater constitutional protection—and lesser
160
state interference—than alternative reproduction.
2. Intimacy Essentialism
Reproductive binarism also reflects and replicates intimacy
essentialism. Co-extensive with sex exceptionalism, intimacy
essentialism is the belief that intimacy is—and ought to be—

158. See Borten, supra note 139, at 1104–08.
159. As one version of the now-discredited procreation rationale for exclusionary marriage laws asserted: “[I]ndividual adults are naturally incomplete
with respect to one biological function: sexual reproduction. In coitus, but not
in other forms of sexual contact, a man and a woman’s bodies coordinate by
way of their sexual organs for the common biological purpose of reproduction.”
Sherif Girgis et al., What Is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 254
(2010); see also Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 302 (1995) (arguing that individuals who
engage in sexual acts other than traditional sexual coitus “treat their bodies
. . . as means or instruments in ways that damage their personal (and interpersonal) integrity” (footnote omitted)).
160. See, e.g., Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1882 (arguing
that “[a]utonomy interests are implicated differently in assisted reproduction
. . . than they are in sexual reproduction or romantic dating”).
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non-commercial, private, and dyadic rather than commercial,
161
public, and polyadic. Resting on a narrow and particularized
conception of both “intimacy” and “commerce,” intimacy essentialism is the artifact of a Victorian ideology that viewed family
162
and markets as incompatible “separate spheres.” Intimacy
essentialism informs countless legal debates, from those sur163
rounding the criminal prohibition of sex work and polyga164
165
my to those surrounding the sale of body parts, and it
166
drives large swathes of family law. Even as it obscures the
167
significant overlap that exists between family and markets,
intimacy essentialism remains one of family’ law’s most deeply
rooted canons.
Just as intimacy essentialism persists in family law more
168
generally, so too does it “linger[] on” in the legal treatment of
alternative reproduction, from bioethical and legal debates over
gamete donor compensation and the moral status of surrogacy
169
agreements to judicial resolution of embryo disputes. It also
persists in judicial, legislative, and scholarly treatment of the
161. Intimacy essentialism is also the belief that certain forms of intimacy—namely sexual intimacy—are superior to other forms, like emotional intimacy. To the extent that that aspect of intimacy essentialism is a by-product
of sex exceptionalism, it was addressed above and will not be revisited here (at
least directly).
162. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 180 (2013) (arguing that separate
spheres were “rooted in the protection of the marital relationship from the debasing influences of the market”).
163. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 276–85 (1999);
Emens, supra note 7, at 354; Nussbaum, supra note 154.
164. See Davis, supra note 12, at 2033–35.
165. See generally Meredith M. Render, The Law of the Body, 62 EMORY
L.J. 549 (2013) (discussing the need for a property framework to explain the
legal status of the human body).
166. See Emens, supra note 7, at 355–56.
167. See generally Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the
Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (explaining
the commonalities between business and family structures).
168. Matsumura, supra note 162.
169. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 140–48 (1996);
Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1756–65 (2010)
(discussing legal debates over compensated egg donation); Matsumura, supra
note 162, at 181–83 (discussing the “separate spheres” logic on which courts
rely when refusing to enforce embryo agreements between intimates); Douglas
NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood 38 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (arguing that states that “proscribe only compensated surrogacy” follow “an approach [that] discipline[s] a woman who transgresses ‘separate
spheres’ ideology when she converts the private domain of the home into the
public sphere of the market”).

652

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:617

issues covered so far in this Article. Recall the Doe v. Hamburg
court’s statement that the FDA regulations at issue in that case
did not deprive the plaintiff-donee of “any general constitutional right to procreate” because she was procreating through
170
what the court viewed as commercial means. “The only thing
Ms. Doe is deprived of,” the court declared, “is the right to have
Mr. Arsenault’s child specifically through a ‘commercial’ (i.e.,
171
nonintimate) relationship.” Reminiscent of the judicial rhetoric of an earlier era, the Hamburg court’s reasoning betokens
an ideology of “separate spheres” and furthers the belief that
172
commerce and intimacy are radically distinct. Under this
view, intimacy connotes something other than commerce, and
vice versa.
In addition, intimacy essentialism and its ideology of “separate spheres” animate paternity determinations in most states
as well as recent proposals to regulate alternative reproduction.
States rely on intimacy essentialism when finding that reproduction that is more intimate, familiar, and private tends to result in familial status, whereas reproduction that is less inti173
mate, familiar, and private tends to avoid it. Fox also relies
on intimacy essentialism when he differentiates between commercial dating sites and commercial gamete banks, the latter of
which “mediate[] the practice of reproduction to eliminate the
intimacy—and with it the relational autonomy interests—that
characterize the connection between consensual sexual part174
ners.” Cahn does as well when she argues that alternative
reproduction can be regulated because it “require[s] the involvement of someone outside the family, a third party who is
175
not within the protected sphere of sexually intimate conduct.”
170. Doe v. Hamburg, Case No. 12D-2686, 2013 WL 3783749, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. July 16, 2013).
171. Id. at *6–7.
172. See id.
173. See supra Part I.A.
174. Fox, Choosing Your Child’s Race, supra note 103, at 11; See also Fox,
Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1883.
175. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9 at 1106. Intimacy essentialism is also reflected in the argument that alternative reproduction can be subject to governmental regulation because it is more “public” than “private” sexual reproduction. See Michael H. Shapiro, I Want a Girl (Boy) Just Like the Girl (Boy)
that Married Dear Old Dad (Mom): Cloning Lives, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1,
71 (1999) (stating that under one view the so-called “public” aspect of alternative reproduction renders it susceptible to regulation because “[w]e often regard market transactions involving ‘commodities’—products or services—as
having strong ‘public’ aspects subject to governmental regulation that is easily
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C. HISTORICAL EXPLANATION
As suggested earlier, reproductive binarism could be the
living artifact of the legal and cultural transformation of alter176
native insemination from an illicit to a licit activity. Until the
1970s, alternative insemination was conceptualized in sexual
177
terms, with courts and commentators likening it to adultery
178
and deeming the resulting children “illegitimate.” Indeed,
even the medical establishment followed certain protocols to
179
“sexualize” alternative insemination.
For instance, prior to the procedure doctors insisted that
women engage in sexual intercourse in order “to achieve artificial procreation in conditions that resemble[d] conception
180
through sexual intercourse.” They also sexualized and naturalized the “artificial” process by having the husband adminis181
ter the syringe and by using anesthesia, a pain blocker that
“was not a necessary component of this simple, unpainful pro182
cedure.” “The connection between sex and procreation was
apparently so deeply embedded in social morality that there
was a need to purposefully insert an element of sex into the ar183
tificial procedure,” Gaia Bernstein writes. “Rendering the
wife unconscious served both the purpose of controlling her
sexuality while another men’s [sic] sperm was injected and of
184
sparing her from fully facing the artificiality of the act,” she
continues.

justified as against constitutional claims of right”); see also Garrison, Law
Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 849–50 (discussing judicial and
legislative responses to legal issues surrounding IVF); Rao, supra note 134, at
1473 (arguing that “the government may regulate ARTs so long as they involve embryos or fetuses that are viable or outside a woman’s body” (emphasis
added)).
176. See Swanson, supra note 16, at 594.
177. On this question, see Swanson, supra note 16, at 618 (observing that
under some courts’ reasoning, “the married mother of a donor child was guilty
of adultery, and perhaps the donor was as well. Maybe it was the doctor who
committed adultery, as he injected the sperm. If he was not a direct party to
adultery, perhaps the doctor’s involvement might fit under the legal definition
of conspiracy to commit a crime”).
178. Id.
179. Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A
Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1064 (2002).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1050.
182. Id. at 1058.
183. Id. at 1050.
184. Id. at 1058.
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The 1960s and 1970s witnessed important legal developments that led to the legitimization—and simultaneous de185
sexualization—of alternative insemination. The advent and
legalization of the pill, which was “the peak of the process of
the removal of reproduction from sex,” also “affected the paral186
lel revolution of the removal of sex from reproduction.” Similarly, a landmark decision from the California Supreme Court
187
in 1968, People v. Sorensen, held that it was “patently absurd
188
. . . to consider [alternative insemination] adultery.” Finally,
in 1973, the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) legitimized alternative insemination when performed by a doctor on a married
189
woman, and “[b]y the end of the 1970s at least fifteen states
had statutes regulating [alternative insemination] and specifi190
cally mentioning [alternative insemination by donor].”
In legitimizing alternative insemination, regulators and
commentators simultaneously de-sexualized it. Like the UPA,
states that passed alternative insemination statutes made clear
that the legality of the procedure depended on whether a thirdparty intermediary—specifically, a doctor—participated in life
191
creation. As Kara Swanson explains: “The participation of a
doctor did the cultural work of transforming what some considered a variation of adultery into a treatment for infertility, that
192
is, ‘sin into therapy.’”
The separation of alternative insemination and sex continued into the 1990s and 2000s, which witnessed the proliferation of the “artificial insemination by intercourse” argument
193
In rejecting that argument, courts
considered in Part I.
“refus[ed] to equate the [sexual insemination] situation with
194
that of a donor through [alternative insemination].” That refusal, Bernstein contends, “points to the limits of [alternative
insemination’s] acceptance—[alternative insemination] has not
195
to this day achieved equal standing with sexual intercourse.”
185. Id. at 1084–85.
186. Id.
187. People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 501 (Cal. 1968).
188. Id.
189. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973).
190. Bernstein, supra note 179, at 1090.
191. See id.
192. KARA W. SWANSON, BANKING ON THE BODY: THE MARKET IN BLOOD,
MILK, AND SPERM IN MODERN AMERICA 225 (2014).
193. Bernstein, supra note 180, at 1091.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1091–92.
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Bernstein is right to suggest that the judicial rejection of
the “artificial insemination by intercourse” argument indicates
that alternative reproduction has not “achieved equal standing
with sexual intercourse.” But the reverse is also true, namely
that sexual intercourse has not “achieved equal standing” with
alternative insemination. As explored in Part I, reproductive
binarism burdens—albeit in different ways—sexual and alternative reproduction. Just as alternative reproduction is saddled
with regulations and requirements from which sexual intercourse is largely, if not completely, exempt, so too is sexual procreation burdened with requirements from which alternative
196
procreation is largely, if not completely, exempt.
It is therefore more accurate to say that the disaggregation
of sexual intercourse and alternative insemination has resulted
in a situation where the law treats sexual and alternative insemination differently on the presumption that the two are factually distinct. Often this different treatment—the very definition of reproductive binarism—burdens alternative procreation.
But sometimes it burdens sexual reproduction as well.
III. CHALLENGING THE BINARY: FACTUAL
INACCURACIES
This Article now moves from Part I and II’s descriptive and
explanatory account of the law’s sex/non-sex binary to Part III
and IV’s interrogation of it. Part III begins that challenge by
arguing that sexual and alternative reproduction are more formally similar than the sex/non-sex binary assumes. Section A
demonstrates that sexual and alternative reproduction are categories that share a number of common attributes. Section B
demonstrates that in some instances sexual and alternative reproduction are the same thing. The objective of this Part is twofold: first, to show that the factors on which the law relies to
justify a dual system of reproductive regulation could just as
easily describe one form of procreation as another; and second,
to argue that those factors are ultimately insufficient to sustain
that dual system because they are vague, imprecise, and susceptible to inconsistent applications.

196. See Appleton, supra note 50, at 93–94.
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A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SEXUAL AND ALTERNATIVE
REPRODUCTION
Commentators who support a dual system of reproductive
regulation argue that alternative and sexual reproduction differ in essential ways that are (or ought to be) legally relevant.
First, they argue that alternative reproduction requires outside, third-party assistance and is likely to involve anonymous
interactions between strangers. Second, they argue that alternative reproduction is commercial and therefore presumptively
non-intimate. Cahn invokes these characteristics when she
writes that unlike sexually conceived children, “donorconceived children require the involvement of someone outside
the family, a third party who is not within the protected sphere
197
of sexually intimate conduct.” Fox does as well when he argues that “[a]utonomy interests are implicated differently in
assisted reproduction . . . than they are in sexual reproduction
198
or romantic dating.” Unlike the “romantic matching context,”
Fox maintains, alternative reproduction “is characterized less
199
by intimacy than anonymity.”
Even scholars who support private ordering in alternative
reproductive matters tend to assume that alternative reproduction “unbundles” procreation and intimacy in novel ways that
200
distinguish it from sexual reproduction. For instance, Marjorie Shultz supports intent-based parenthood, but argues that it
201
ought to be limited to “artificial or assisted reproduction.” In
justifying procreative intentionality for assisted but not for
sexual reproduction, Shultz adverts to intimacy: whereas “ordinary procreation” involves sexual relationships between intimates (for whom intent-based parenthood through contract is

197. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9 at 1106.
198. Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1882.
199. Id. at 1883.
200. See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and IntentBased Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
297, 299–300 (stating that “because processes that previously were bundled
can now be separated, procreation can be depersonalized: biological reproduction can be separated from the social and physical context of interpersonal intimacy” (emphasis added)); id. at 311 (stating that reproductive technology
offers the possibility that “procreation can be separated from sexual intimacy”). Professor Shultz’s arguments assume that alternative reproduction introduces a novel aspect into reproduction generally: the separation of procreation and “interpersonal intimacy.” Id. at 315.
201. Id. at 323–24.
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202

alternative reproduction inunsuitable, in Shultz’s view),
volves “deliberative” and planned interactions between “nonintimates” (for whom intent-based parenthood through contract
203
is entirely appropriate).
A moment’s reflection reveals the problems with Shultz’s
and others’ use of sex as a proxy for conventional understandings of non-commerciality, privacy and intimacy. Reproduction
the “old-fashioned way” can be assisted and non-intimate in
ways ordinarily associated with “assisted” reproduction, as
Subsection 1 argues. Moreover, “assisted” reproduction can be
intimate and unpredictable in ways typically associated with
sexual reproduction, as Subsection 2 reveals.
1. Assisted, Non-Intimate Sexual Reproduction
Sexual reproduction is no less “assisted” than “assisted”
204
reproduction. Indeed, the very phrase “assisted reproduction”
obscures the basic fact that all human reproduction is “assisted” in some way, as parthenogenesis, like Athena springing
from Zeus’ head or Typhon issuing from Hera, is humanly im205
possible. Considered from the point of view of the right holder—the individual who desires to procreate—all procreation requires “assistance.” Proposals to regulate alternative
reproduction that are predicated, either in whole or in part, on
202. See id. at 325.
203. See id. at 324.
204. Most commentators refer to alternative reproduction as “assisted reproduction” rather than the less inaccurate “alternative reproduction.” See,
e.g., Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9, at 1080 (referencing “assisted reproductive
technology”); Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103 (referencing “assisted
reproduction”); Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1042 (referring to “assisted reproductive technology”); Robertson, supra note 122, passim (referencing “assisted
reproduction”). But see Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, supra note 14, at 80 (using “alternative insemination” rather than “assisted insemination”).
205. The goddess Athena is often cited as an example of male parthenogenesis, as she sprung from Zeus’ head. However, it is more accurate to say that
Athena is an example of female parthenogenesis, as she was originally conceived by Metis, Zeus’ first wife, with no assistance. Angry with Metis for being pregnant with a child allegedly more powerful than him, Zeus consumed
Metis—and, along with her, the unborn Athena. Months later, Zeus “gave
birth” to Athena when the latter sprung from his head. While Hesiod’s
Theogony reports that Typhon was the son of Gaia (Earth) and Tartarus, the
later Homeric Hymn to Apollo explains Typhon’s conception in
parthenogenetic terms. Angry at her husband for birthing Athena by himself,
Hera prayed to Gaia to give her a son; Hera become pregnant with Typhon after slapping the ground. See HESIOD, THEOGONY (Richard S. Caldwell trans.,
1987); HOMERIC HYMNS (Sarah Ruden trans., 2005).
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the belief that third-party assistance renders procreative conduct more susceptible to state regulation fail to recognize that
the difference between “third-party” and “second-party” repro206
duction is one of degree (if even that), not one of kind.
More specifically, though, sexual reproduction often requires the kind of assistance—commercial, “third-party” assistance—that people ordinarily associate with alternative reproduction. For example, surveys suggest that a not insignificant
number of individuals are thinking of someone else while hav207
ing sex and are doing so in order to have sex. In addition,
whole industries exist—sex aid pharmaceuticals, pornography,
sex toys, sex therapy—for the purpose of facilitating sexual de208
sire and sexual intercourse. To the extent that procreation is
the by-product, whether intentional or not, of that intercourse,
it cannot be said that alternative reproduction is radically different than sexual procreation because of the third-party assistance and commerce that it involves. All of the abovementioned industries illuminate the commercial character of
sexual reproduction, as well as the role that third-party intermediaries often play in facilitating it. As such, arguments to
regulate alternative reproduction on the ground that it involves

206. That is, the phrase “third-party” reproduction conceals the fact that
much of the time reproduction with donated gametic materials—the conventional definition of “third-party” reproduction—occurs, like sex, between just
two parties: a sperm donor and a single woman. Julie Shapiro observes that
“the term ‘third-party’ [reproduction] can be a little misleading [because]
[w]hen a single woman uses sperm from a sperm bank to have a child, she’s
the first party and the provider of the sperm is a third party and there isn’t
any second party.” Julie Shapiro, What Should the Rules Be: Thoughts About
Third-Party Reproduction, WORDPRESS (Nov. 17, 2011), https://julieshapiro
.wordpress.com/2011/11/17/what-should-the-rules-be-thoughts-about-third
-party-reproduction. Alternatively, one could think about the single woman as
the “first party” and the sperm donor as the “second party.” According to the
California Cryobank, one of the nation’s largest sperm banks, single women
comprise thirty percent of its business and that figure is projected to be “more
than 60 percent . . . in 20 years.” Carlos Frías, Single Women Who Choose Artificial Insemination Can Learn A Lot About Their Sperm Partner,
PALMBEACHPOST.COM (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/
lifestyles/health/single-women-who-choose-artificial-insemination-ca/nL9Wt.
207. See, e.g., Harold Leitenberg & Kris Henning, Sexual Fantasy, 117
PSYCH. BULL. 469, 481 (1995). See generally The American Sex Survey: A Peek
Beneath the Sheets, ABC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2004), http://abcnews.go.com/images/
Politics/959a1AmericanSexSurvey.pdf (providing statistics on Americans’ sex
lives).
208. See generally DAGMAR HERZOG, SEX IN CRISIS: THE NEW SEXUAL REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2008) (discussing the
Christian right’s influence on sexuality).
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commercial, “third-party” assistance overlook the fact that sexual reproduction often is commercial, “third-party” reproduction.
Second, just as sexual reproduction often requires thirdparty assistance, so too can it result from deliberate, nonintimate, mechanistic, and anonymous interactions—the very
qualities that ostensibly render alternative reproduction susceptible to regulation. Not all sex, procreative or not, is intimate and carefree (indeed, one need only think here of rape);
nor is it all non-anonymous. Some people, in fact, desire artful,
209
non-intimate, anonymous sex, and for many people sex that
210
is artful and controlled is intimate sex. “Our culture is all too
ready to think that sex involves no skill and is simply ‘natural,’” Martha Nussbaum writes. Such a view is “surely false and
211
is not even seriously entertained by many cultures,” she continues.
In addition, for many couples trying to sexually conceive
(and particularly for those who struggle with a diagnosis of infertility), sex is likely to bear many of the characteristics routinely associated with alternative reproduction: control, non212
intimacy, and artificiality. Such couples, according to some
studies, frequently experience a decrease in intimacy not only
in their sexual relations but also in their overall emotional and
213
physical relationship. These couples often remark upon—and
complain about—the programmed character of their sex lives,
which, once spontaneous, become obsessively timed to accom209. See, e.g., Nussbaum, supra note 154, at 703 n.24 (“Certainly
nonintimacy is involved in many noncommercial sexual relationships and is
sometimes desired as such.”).
210. See generally ROBIN BAUER, QUEER BDSM INTIMACIES: CRITICAL
CONSENT AND PUSHING BOUNDARIES (2014) (surveying the intimacies created
by BDSM practitioners).
211. Nussbaum, supra note 154, at 704.
212. See generally Sarah Elizabeth Richards, When Sex Becomes a Chore,
SLATE (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex_health/
2010/04/when_sex_becomes_a_chore.html (discussing how infertility negatively impacts couples’ sex lives).
213. See, e.g., Andrea Mechanick Braverman, Psychosocial Aspects of Infertility: Sexual Dysfunction, 1266 ADVANCES FERTILITY & REPROD. MED. 270,
273 (2004); Leah S. Millheiser et al., Is Infertility a Risk Factor for Female
Sexual Dysfunction? A Case-Control Study, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2022,
2023 (2010) (reporting findings that forty percent of patients with a diagnosis
of infertility exhibited sexual dysfunction, compared to twenty-five percent of
patients without such a diagnosis); Manoj Monga et al., Impact of Infertility on
Quality of Life, Marital Adjustment, and Sexual Function, 63 UROLOGY 126
(2004).
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modate ovulation cycles and peak fertility days. For example,
Professor Shultz writes that, “management of sexual relations
according to menstrual cycle or temperature charts could turn
an intensely personal form of communication into a purely in214
strumental activity.” Studies also indicate that divorce rates
are significantly higher among those couples who fail to con215
ceive after undergoing fertility treatments.
These studies confirm what ought to be common wisdom,
namely that intimacy—at least as that term is used in arguments favoring alternative reproductive regulation—is not
guaranteed for any couple that is trying to conceive, whether
sexually or through alternative means. The fact that sexually
conceived children are at least sometimes, if not often, created
216
under conditions of apparent non-intimacy weakens the claim
that sexual, unlike alternative, procreation merits privacy protection because it sits within the “protected sphere of sexually
217
intimate conduct.” The same characteristic so often invoked
to justify why alternative reproduction can be regulated—nonintimacy—can just as easily apply to sexual procreation.
On this point, consider Steven S. v. Deborah D, which
found that a donor was not a father because conception oc218
curred “artificially” and with physician assistance. There, a
man who helped a woman become pregnant and eventually give
birth to a son sued her to establish paternity over the child.
Steven and Deborah first attempted to conceive “artificially”
with physician assistance, which is required under California
219
law for a man to avoid paternity. Following a miscarriage and

214. Shultz, supra note 200, at 304–05.
215. Shannon Firth, Study: Infertile Couples 3 Times More Likely To Divorce, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/
01/31/study-infertile-couples-3-times-more-likely-to-divorce.
216. To be clear, this Article is not suggesting that deliberately procreative
sex is invariably non-intimate. Rather, it is simply recognizing that procreative sex might (and often does) bear the very characteristics—control, deliberation, and forethought—that commentators use to distinguish between “intimate” procreative sex and “non-intimate” alternative reproduction. For the
view that planned sexual reproduction can sometimes increase intimacy in a
relationship, see KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD, 166–68, 210–13 (1984).
217. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9 at 1106 (emphasis added).
218. 127 Cal. App. 4th 319 (2005).
219. See id. at 326 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b)(2)). Under California’s
donor insemination statutes, donors who use physician assistance can still become fathers if they contract into paternity prior to conception, just as donors
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several subsequent attempts—all unsuccessful—to conceive
with “third-party” assistance, Steven and Deborah started to
engage in “sexual intercourse in an attempt to impregnate
220
Deborah.” No more successful conceiving sexually, however,
Deborah again turned to “third-party” assistance by attempting
to conceive through “artificial” insemination with Steven’s se221
men. Deborah eventually became pregnant and gave birth to
a baby boy. Shortly thereafter, Steven sued for paternal
222
rights, but lost because of the manner in which conception occurred: “artificially” rather than sexually, and with physician
223
assistance.
Most relevant here is the Steven S. court’s descriptions of
alternative and sexual reproduction as each occurred between
Steven and Deborah. The court describes the parties’ act of alternative conception in language suggestive of intimacy: “[Steven] accompanied [Deborah] to the insemination with [Ste224
ven’s] sperm and held her hand during the procedure.” By
contrast, it recounts their sexual insemination in mechanistic
terms suggestive of “artificial” reproduction: “[A]fter the initial
impregnation failed,” the court writes, “the parties engaged in
225
sexual intercourse in an attempt to impregnate Deborah.”
Steven S. unsettles unexamined assumptions regarding the
intrinsic nature of sexual and alternative reproduction—
assumptions that presume a certain kind of intimacy in one
setting but not in the other. As with the vignettes with which
this Article began, sometimes “artificial” reproduction involves
a human touch—literally, in the case of Steven S. And some226
times sexual reproduction is “purely instrumental,” a form of
sexual congress that is no less artful—and perhaps even more
so—than “artificial” reproduction.

who do not use physician assistance can avoid paternity if they contract out of
it prior to conception. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7613(b)(2)(A), (C).
220. Steven S., 127 Cal. App. 4th at 324.
221. Id. at 323.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 327–28.
224. Id. at 323 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 324.
226. Shultz, supra note 200, at 304–05.
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2. Intimate and Unplanned Alternative Reproduction
a. Intimate Alternative Reproduction
Intimacy characterizes alternative reproduction as often as
it does sexual reproduction. As for examples of “intimate” alternative reproduction from the donee’s point of view, the process of finding (and choosing) a donor (or reproductive partner)
is an intimate act that has been analogized to the process of
227
finding a romantic partner. One of the women who conceived
children with the semen of Trent Arsenault argued that she became “sexually intimate” with Mr. Arsenault in the process of
getting to know him, even though she did not have sexual in228
tercourse with him. Similarly, individuals who access the social networks that unite people who desire to reproduce and coparent together outside of a traditional intimate relation229
ship —networks like PollenTree.com, Coparents.com, CoParentMatch.com, MyAlternativeFamily.com, and Modamily230
.com —describe the process of finding a co-parent in terms
reminiscent of romance. “[J]ust like in any relationship,” one
231
user of these networks remarks, “‘there needed to be a spark’”
227. See, e.g., Steve Dilbeck, Sperm Donors Wanted, Only High-Caliber
Jocks Need Apply, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2008), http://www.dailynews
.com/article/ZZ/20080826/NEWS/808269908 (summarizing the remarks of the
California Cryobank’s founder that “any single woman who is out dating for a
husband, or looking for a genetic source for her child, does the same thing” as
a woman looking for a sperm donor).
228. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5,
Doe v. FDA, No. C12–03412(EMC) (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013) http://
causeofaction.org/assets/uploads/2013/01/ECF-No-33_First-Amended
-Complaint.pdf. (“Prior to their first act of conception, Mr. Arsenault and Ms.
Doe formed an intimate bond and close friendship over the course of numerous
conversations. Mr. Arsenault revealed many intimate, personal details of his
life to Ms. Doe and discussed with Ms. Doe his medical history, his health, and
his views on the role of a father who helps a woman in a same-sex relationship
conceive a child and start a family with her partner.” (emphasis added)); see
also Abbasi, supra note 85, at 38 (“[S]exually intimate relationships can involve a broad range of physical and emotional intimacies, only some of which
are contained within the [sexually intimate partner] definition advanced by
the FDA.”).
229. See Alana Semuels, Sperm Donor, Life Partner, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 8,
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/sperm-donor-life
-partner/383421.
230. Indeed, these co-parenting networks mimic romantic sexual networks,
like Match.com, in the language that they use (“match”) to describe the process of finding a reproductive partner.
231. Abby Ellin, Making a Child, Minus the Couple, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/fashion/seeking-to-reproduce
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between him and his parenting mate. He describes his relationship with the woman with whom he chose to reproduce and
232
parent as one where “electricity was palpable from the start.”
Intimacy marks not just the donee’s search for a reproduc233
tive partner, but also her receipt of another person’s gametes.
Whether through alternative insemination or in vitro fertilization, receiving the gametes of another person into the body is a
profoundly intimate act that involves the joining of bodies—not
unlike sex, in fact, save for the body parts that are being
234
joined.
Finally, alternative reproduction might involve emotionally
and physically intimate relations between the donee and her
doctor or sexual interactions between the donee and her partner, if any. Romantic partners of the donee often help the doctor administer the syringe, which, recall, was a way for married
couples to naturalize alternative insemination during the rela235
tively early days of its use. Others inseminate the donee at
home with either a syringe, a turkey baster—the same turkey
baster that effectively converts assisted conception into sexual
conception in Virginia—or a device like the Semenette, which,
as described by its creator, is a “novelty sex toy with specifically
designed inner tubing embedded inside with an attached pump
intended for people to be able to mimic intercourse and ejacula236
tion.” The Semenette’s inventor, Stephanie Berman, has remarked that she wanted to design a sex toy that doubled as an
insemination device in order to conceive a child with her wife in
a way that would allow her to “feel[] connected and involved”

-without-a-romantic-partnership.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&.
232. Id.
233. This Article uses the pronoun “her” to describe most recipients of alternative insemination, but recognizes that some recipients are transgender
men. See generally Laura Nixon, The Right To (Trans)Parent: A Reproductive
Justice Approach to Reproductive Rights, Fertility, and Family-Building Issues
Facing Transgender People, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73 (2014) (exploring ways to include transgender people in the discussion about reproductive
rights).
234. See also Matsumura, supra note 162, at 162 n.18 (using the term “intimate” to describe “agreements dealing with matters typically associated with
intimacy, like sexual reproduction, even if they are made between people at
arms’ length, e.g., surrogacy contracts”).
235. See Bernstein, supra note 180, at 1049–50.
236. Kira Brekke, Introducing the Semenette, a New Sex Toy that Aims To
Help Lesbian Couples Conceive a Baby, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/28/sex-toy-lesbians-baby_n_6957758
.html.
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and “to really feel like [she] had [a] bond in conceiving [her]
237
daughter.” As a recent Slate piece reports, lesbian couples
like Berman and her partner are increasingly opting for these
238
more “intimate” and “romantic” do-it-yourself inseminations.
As for examples of “intimate” alternative insemination
from the donor’s point of view, sperm donors may very well experience intimacy upon donating semen—despite the FDA’s as239
sumption that sperm donation is not an “intimate” activity,
even when it occurs within the privacy of one’s home. Donors
engage in intimate self-expression when reading the pornography supplied by sperm banks and using it to create semen
240
through masturbation. This is the same pornography, it bears
mention, that receives constitutional protection in part because
it “satisf[ies] intellectual and emotional needs,” according to the
241
Supreme Court.
237. Id.
238. Jillian Keenan, Beyond the Turkey Baster, SLATE (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/08/intrauterine_
insemination_at_home_midwives_are_performing_iuis_without_formal.html.
239. See supra notes 85, 88 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA’s
refusal to grant non-sexual sperm donations between non-anonymous partners
the mandatory testing exemption that it grants to “sexually intimate partners”
under 21 C.F.R. Part 1271).
240. It is also worth noting that for some donors the donation process involves warmth, fun, intimacy, and human connection—making it look less like
the transactional process sometimes conjured by those who describe gamete
donation in purely commercial and institutionalized terms. Some male donors,
for instance, gain pleasure from their work, as shown by sociologist Rene
Almeling in her observational study of gamete providers and consumers. RENE
ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM 105
(2011). Demystifying an industry that is often conceptualized in purely “artificial” terms, Almeling reveals that at least one third of the sperm donors whom
she interviewed said that “donation was pleasurable or fun, as it entailed an
approved moment of looking at pornography and having an orgasm.” Id.
Almeling’s work on egg donation similarly debunks common images of that
practice as painful and unpleasant. See id. at 108 (stating that “egg donors describe the injections and egg retrieval in much less onerous terms than do infertile women because being paid thousands of dollars and not trying to become pregnant results in a different embodied experience of IVF”). Indeed,
Almeling’s research on the “embodied experience” of gamete donation challenges the dominant conception of alternative reproduction as a world populated by corporate brokers and their arm’s length transactions. See id. at 8
(arguing that gamete donors’ physical experience of gamete donation is shaped
by factors independent of the actual physical donation process); Rene Almeling
& Iris Willey, Same Medicine, Different Reasons: Comparing Women’s Bodily
Experience of Producing Eggs for Pregnancy or for Profit (2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (testing and reporting results confirming the
“embodiment” phenomenon in the context of egg donation).
241. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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These examples of “intimate” alternative reproduction from
both the donee and the donor’s point of view suggest that alternative reproduction is as intimate as sexual reproduction from
a qualitative as well as a quantitative perspective. In fact, in
many cases there might even be more intimacy “to go around,”
so to speak, in the alternative reproductive context than in the
sexual reproductive context. The intimacy of alternative reproduction travels along multiple pathways and diverse distributional channels, uniting donor, donee, romantic partner, doctor,
and sperm bank personnel, among others. Even if face-to-face
“interface” does not exist between donor and donee, and even if
the “interface” between donor and donee implicates com242
merce, meaningful connection often does exist between and
among all of the players involved in this distributional web.
Some scholars assume that “meaningful interface” is absent in
alternative reproduction—thereby rendering it susceptible to
243
the state’s regulatory ambition, but also more reliable from a
244
contractual perspective —because it does not involve certain
body parts uniting with others in a single moment of heterosexual coitus or because it involves multiple players engaged in
presumptively commercial activity. That assumption, however,
privileges a narrow and dyadic conception of human intimacy
over the more expansive and polyadic forms of connection and
human flourishing that alternative reproduction often makes
245
possible.

242. For a view challenging the dominant conception of commercial contracts as unnatural (and therefore presumptively non-intimate), see Martha
M. Ertman, Private Ordering Under the ALI Principles: As Natural as Status,
in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 284, 285–86 (Mary
Ann Glendon & Robin Wilson eds., 2006).
243. See, e.g., Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1883.
244. Shultz, supra note 200, at 324 (“[T]he time, effort, emotion and money
expended; and the involvement of non-intimates . . . mean that the intentions
of those involved [in alternative reproduction] are more likely to be deliberative, explicit and bargained-for than is[ ] the case in most situations of ordinary coital reproduction.”).
245. Adrienne Davis makes a similar point with respect to opposition to
polygamy, part of which, she argues, derives from a discomfort with “multiple
players” in a marital or relational context. See Davis, supra note 12, at 2037
(“Essentialist claims that dyadicism is ‘good’ and polyfidelity is ‘bad’ naturalizes dyadic marriage as a static institution with an intrinsic set of ‘idealized’
traits, obscuring it as a product of political and legal struggle and reform”); see
also Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure 52 STAN. L.
REV. 353 (2000) (arguing that opposition to bisexuality stems, in part, from a
discomfort with the “excess” or “surfeit” that it represents).
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Indeed, even the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized
that intimacy often exists in clinical settings like the doctor’s
office. “[T]he constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing,” the Paris
Adult Theatre v. Slaton Court observed, “is not just concerned
with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relation246
ship.” “Such protected privacy,” the Court continued, “extends
to the doctor’s office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as other247
wise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved.” As
far back as 1973, then, when Paris Adult Theatre was decided,
the Court recognized that intimacy—including procreative intimacy—was a capacious concept that applied to certain relationships and places (doctor/patient, doctor’s office) no less than
248
it did to others (sexual partners, bedroom).
b. Unplanned Alternative Reproduction
Just as it can be intimate, alternative reproduction can also be unplanned—another attribute typically associated only
with sexual procreation, even if the reality behind it, as Subsection 1 showed, often suggests otherwise. The dominant conception of alternative reproduction is one of control, planning, and
deliberation. Objections to alternative reproduction for trying
to replace the randomness of sexual procreation with eugenic
249
perfection rest on this conception, as did laws that excluded
same-sex couples from marriage for being “too good” at procrea250
tion.
246. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973).
247. Id.
248. As the Paris Adult Theatre Court observed, the Supreme Court had
already implicitly recognized in Roe v. Wade, decided just five months before
Paris Adult Theatre, that the Constitution protects procreative intimacy between doctor and patient no less than it protects procreative intimacy between
married persons. Id. at 66 n.13 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), for
the proposition that constitutional privacy “extends to the doctor’s office”).
249. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION 45
(2007) (arguing against “bioengineering and genetic enhancement” in part because “we do not choose our children. Their qualities are unpredictable, and
even the most conscientious parents cannot be held wholly responsible for the
kind of child they have”); Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1884
(arguing that the law ought to discourage gamete banks from making race salient in donor selection in part because “it seems unfitting for the affective ties
parents have for their future child to be conditional on the child’s being born
with whatever qualities—ingenuity, athleticism, or their own racial features—
parents happen to prefer”).
250. Kenji Yoshino, Too Good for Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/opinion/14yoshino.html?_r=0 (discussing
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More specifically, starting in the 2000s, several courts
started to uphold laws prohibiting same-sex marriage by adverting to states’ legitimate interest in “responsible procreation.” The responsible procreation rationale theorized that
same-sex couples did not need marriage because their procreation, if any, was planned and predictable—unlike the procreation of opposite-sex couples, which, on this view, was often un251
In one court’s words: “[Alternative
planned and chaotic.
reproduction] require[s] a great deal of foresight and planning.
‘Natural’ procreation, on the other hand, may occur . . . with no
252
This justification for exclusionary
foresight or planning.”
marriage laws conceptualized heterosexual procreation as an
(often) “accidental” consequence of sex and marriage as the
normatively necessary institutional response to that accident.
On this telling, same-sex couples did not need marriage because their procreation was never accidental, always planned.
Even as it undercut the stereotype of sexual minorities as
253
dissolute sexual actors, the responsible procreation argument
perpetuated the stereotype of gays and lesbians as a moneyed
class for whom legal protections, like marriage, were unneces254
sary. It also perpetuated another misconception: that alternative reproduction was deliberate and planned in ways that distinguished it from chaotic and unplanned sexual procreation.
This misconception was particularly injurious, as it constituted
the primary justificatory basis for many states’ exclusionary
marriage laws for years.
The responsible procreation rationale was only half right.
It captured the reality that same-sex couples “plan” to have a
child when undertaking alternative reproduction, unlike opposite-sex couples, whose sex sometimes results in “unplanned”
pregnancies. It failed to capture, however, the reality that
same-sex couples do not necessarily “plan” for all of the consequences of that reproduction. As with sex, unpredictable events
and critiquing the “responsible procreation” rationale for exclusionary marriage laws).
251. See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
252. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
253. See Douglas NeJaime, Marriage, Biology, and Gender, 98 IOWA L.
REV. BULL. 83, 89 (2013); Julie A. Nice, The Descent of Responsible Procreation: A Genealogy of an Ideology, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 781, 789–90 (2012).
254. On this stereotype and its role in shoring up the responsible procreation rationale, see Courtney Megan Cahill, The Genuine Article: A Subversive
Economic Perspective on the Law’s Procreationist Vision of Marriage, 64 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 393, 443–44 (2007) [hereinafter Cahill, The Genuine Article].
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might follow from alternative reproduction. A woman might be
alternatively inseminated with semen from a donor other than
the one whom she chose; a “mix-up” of this kind was the subject
of a recent (unsuccessful) lawsuit against a sperm bank in Illi255
nois. Or, a donor who is not screened by a bank for a particular genetic condition might transmit that condition to a child,
256
which has happened in some cases. While alternative reproduction might involve “a great deal of foresight and plan257
ning,” no reproduction is perfect, and mistakes or “accidents”
can result from alternative reproduction just as they can result
from sex.
The responsible procreation rationale and the “planned”/
“unplanned” reproductive binary on which it rested has faded
into oblivion, rejected by courts, including the Supreme Court,
258
as incorrect, farcical even. But its erroneous assumptions
about sexual and alternative reproduction persist in the law’s
dual system of reproductive regulation. Paradigms of “nature”
and “artifice” continue to influence—and distort—legal understandings of sexual and alternative reproduction, even as the
lived experience of those who engage in those methods of life
creation suggests a more complicated picture.
B. PERFECT IDENTITY BETWEEN SEXUAL AND ALTERNATIVE
REPRODUCTION
Sometimes, sexual and alternative reproduction share similar traits: intimacy and non-intimacy, planning and chance.
Other times, sexual and alternative reproduction are exactly
the same thing. Consider the growing practice of “one-night
255. Abby Phillip, White Woman Accidentally Inseminated with Black
Man’s Sperm Loses Legal Battle, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2015), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/05/white-woman
-accidentally-impregnated-with-black-mans-sperm-loses-legal-battle (discussing the story of Jennifer Cramblett, who lost her wrongful birth lawsuit
against the sperm bank that mistakenly gave her fertility specialist sperm
from the wrong donor).
256. Denise Grady, As the Use of Donor Sperm Increases, Secrecy Can Be a
Health Hazard, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/
06/health/06opin.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (discussing the story of an anonymous donor who “passed a serious gene defect to five” of the children conceived from his sperm).
257. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 24.
258. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 662 (7th Cir. 2014) (dismissing the
responsible procreation rationale as completely nonsensical). The demise of
the responsible procreation rationale is discussed at greater length infra Part
IV.B.
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stand” or “natural” inseminations, where a man donates his
259
sperm by sexually inseminating a woman for free. Natural
insemination is an attractive procreative option for some women because it provides them with the opportunity to avoid
third-party brokers, like sperm banks and fertility providers,
which might discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,
260
marital status, or both; it also allows them to use fresh semen, which some believe maximizes the chances for concep261
tion. In at least one jurisdiction, Québec, Canada, natural insemination is a formally recognized method of alternative
conception. Under the Québec law, a man can donate sperm
262
sexually to a woman and remain a “donor.” While no American jurisdiction recognizes a similar category of “artificial insemination by intercourse,” as Part I revealed, some scholars
263
have expressed varying degrees of support for it.
The men and women who enter into natural insemination
agreements regard the sexual aspect of the donation as irrelevant to the legal status of the child that results from it. Unlike
courts, which maintain strict legal distinctions between sexual

259. For media coverage of this phenomenon, see Elizabeth Picciuto, Have
Sperm, Will Travel: The ‘Natural Inseminators’ Helping Women Avoid the
Sperm Bank, DAILY BEAST (Nov. 29, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/11/29/have-sperm-will-travel-the-natural-inseminators-helping
-women-avoid-the-sperm-bank.html; Jeff Schneider, Muriel Pearson, & Alexa
Valiente, Meet the Men Having Sex with Strangers To Help Them Have Babies,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/Lifestyle/meet-men-sex
-strangers-babies/story?id=26870643.
260. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Sup. Ct., 189
P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (finding that the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution did not bar a woman’s lawsuit against her fertility provider for
discriminating against her on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of a
state public accommodations statute); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive
Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L.
& JUST. 18, 45 (2008) (discussing legislative proposals to restrict alternative
reproductive technologies to certain groups like married women but observing
that such proposals have so far failed to garner enough support).
261. See Picciuto, supra note 259.
262. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art 538.2 (Can.). The law, however, allows the man to establish paternity within one year of the child’s birth.
See id. Should this occur, the man “will displace the biological mother’s partner”—if any—“as the child’s other legal parent.” Nicholas Bala & Christine
Ashbourne, The Widening Concept of “Parent” in Canada: Step-Parents, SameSex Partners, & Parents by ART, 20 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 525, 542
(2012).
263. See Appleton, supra note 50, at 111 (suggesting that the law might
consider this practice); Polikoff, supra note 126, at 59 (supporting this practice).
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264

and alternative insemination, the parties to natural insemination agreements prefer instead to conceptualize sex as merely one among many legally equivalent life-creating mechanisms. In this sense, natural insemination throws into relief
the volatility of a binary that was never completely stable to
begin with but that has grown even less so over time.
C. SUMMARY
Different treatment of sexual and alternative reproduction
is predicated on an incoherent factual assumption: that sexual
and alternative reproduction are different in fact, therefore
meriting different treatment in law. As this Part has shown,
rather than assuming that sexual and alternative reproduction
occupy the “extreme” ends of a single reproductive continuum,
265
as the Ferguson v. McKiernan court suggested, it is more accurate to say that sexual and alternative reproduction exist on
their own continuum, one which is defined by “natural” and
“artificial” extremes. For instance, sexual reproduction can be
natural, uncontrolled, and unpredictable, or it can be artful,
controlled, and planned. Similarly, alternative reproduction can
bear the presumed hallmarks of natural sex—uncontrolled and
intimate—or it can be more artful and controlled. Remapping
the law’s reproductive binary in this way illuminates the qualitative similarities between sexual and alternative reproduction
and complicates the law’s dual system of procreative regulation. It shows that the factors on which the law relies to justify
a dual system of reproductive regulation—intimacy, familiarity, sex, deliberation, control, predictability, and naturalness—
could just as easily describe one form of procreation as another.
In addition, remapping the binary in this way not only reveals the many similarities between, and in some cases perfect
overlap of, sexual and alternative reproduction; it also suggests
the deficiencies of basing reproductive regulation on factors—
like intimacy—that are vague, imprecise, and easily susceptible
to conflicting applications. For instance, under California law
Mr. Arsenault is a father because he did not use a doctor in the
insemination process; as such, his procreative activity was intimate in a way that excluded it from the class of procreative

264. See supra notes 42, 43, 51, 252, and accompanying text.
265. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1246 (Pa. 2007) (describing
sexual and alternative reproduction as two “extremes” on a reproductive continuum).
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acts protected by California’s alternative insemination statute.
Under federal law, however, Mr. Arsenault is a de facto sperm
bank because his relationships with his procreative donees
were not intimate enough for him to receive the FDA testing
exemption for sexually intimate partners. If under state law
Mr. Arsenault’s acts were too intimate, under federal law they
were insufficiently so. Intimacy, it appears, simply cannot do
the work that it must to sustain the sex/non-sex binary because
no one can reliably define what intimacy does and does not
mean.
IV. CHALLENGING THE BINARY: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEFICIENCIES
Even if sexual and alternative reproduction were formally
distinct, and even if the law’s sex/non-sex binary were not predicated on vague and imprecise factors like intimacy, that binary
would still raise concern as a matter of constitutional law. The
Supreme Court’s landmark marriage equality decision in
266
Obergefell v. Hodges suggests that alternative reproduction is
a fundamental right, thereby challenging those who argue that
the state can regulate alternative reproduction because it lacks
robust constitutional protection. In addition, the Court’s existing and emerging jurisprudence on sexual privacy and family
formation suggests that procreation is constitutionally significant not because of how it occurs—sexually or alternatively—
but rather because of what it effectuates: family formation and
intentional parenthood. As such, that jurisprudence calls into
question the sex/non-sex binary and sex exceptionalism more
generally; it also casts doubt on the law’s privileging of form
over intent, and of one form of intimacy over another, in reproductive matters.
A. ALTERNATIVE REPRODUCTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Many, if not most, of the proposed regulations of alternative reproduction discussed in Part I rest either explicitly or
implicitly on the “premise” that “reproduction through [reproductive] technologies is a ‘lower status’ kind of reproduction,
267
worthy of less protection.” Obergefell destabilizes that prem266. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
267. Cohen, supra note 125, at 445; see also Mary Patricia Byrn & Rebecca
Ireland, Anonymously Provided Sperm and the Constitution, 23 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 20 (2012).
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ise not only by suggesting that procreation is a fundamental
right—as opposed to a more modest equality right—but also by
laying the foundation for protecting alternative reproduction
under that right.
The Constitution makes no reference to a procreative right,
let alone to a sexually procreative right. Constitutional text
alone, then, does not mandate different treatment of sexual and
alternative conception; nor does that text contemplate the
privileged status often assigned to the former in contemporary
discussions about alternative reproductive regulation.
In addition, neither the history surrounding, nor the text
of, the case that purportedly established the fundamental right
268
to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supports the argument
that only sexual procreation receives fundamental right status.
Skinner nowhere mentions sexual procreation specifically; instead, it refers to procreation in more general terms, stating:
“Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very exist269
ence and survival of the race.” Furthermore, when Skinner
acknowledged the constitutional importance of procreation in
1942, alternative insemination was not just available but also
270
used on a “widescale basis.”
Finally, Supreme Court doctrine nowhere suggests that
procreation merits constitutional protection only if it results
271
from sexual intercourse.

268. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down Oklahoma’s mandatory sterilization law under the federal Equal Protection Clause). For the view that Skinner
established a fundamental right to procreate under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Wu, supra note 124, at 1475 (“The strongest precedent for establishing a fundamental right to procreate is Skinner.”). Not all scholars endorse
that view; they instead argue that Skinner at most establishes a more modest
equality right in procreative matters. See infra notes 272, 285, and accompanying text.
269. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. For the view that Skinner forged a right to
procreate in the shadow of sexual procreation specifically, see Ariela R.
Dubler, Sexing Skinner: History and the Politics of the Right To Marry, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1359 (2010) (reading Skinner not just as a case about
the dangers of totalitarianism and forced sterilization, but also “as a case
about the larger phenomenon of disentangling sex from reproduction and the
social anxieties raised by that separation”).
270. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a “Parent”?: The Claims
of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 353 (1991).
271. The Supreme Court has never applied Skinner to a case about alternative reproduction, nor has it ever had the occasion to do so. See id. at 367.
As Dubler shows, Skinner “languished in relative obscurity” for decades after
it was decided. Dubler, supra note 269, at 1370. When it was finally cited—
first by Justice Harlan in his 1961 Poe v. Ullman dissent, 367 U.S. 497, 543
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To the contrary, the Court’s recent decision in Obergefell
indicates that the Constitution protects not just procreation but
alternative procreation specifically as a fundamental right.
Obergefell provides critical guidance on two procreation-specific
questions that have remained unanswered since Skinner. The
first is whether procreation is a fundamental right under the
Due Process Clause or a more limited equality right. The second is whether the constitutional right to procreate includes
the right to reproduce through alternative means.
As for the first issue, Obergefell suggests that procreation
is a fundamental liberty right rather than a more modest
equality right, as some scholars who support alternative repro272
ductive regulation have argued. As it does with the right to
marry, which before Obergefell was grounded in equality rather
273
than exclusively in liberty, Obergefell discusses procreation in
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and four years later by Justice Douglas, Skinner ’s author, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)—it was subtly transformed from a case about (marital) procreation into one about marital
privacy and the importance of extending constitutional protection to spouses’
decisions not to reproduce. By 1967, when the Court cited Skinner in support
of a constitutional right to marry in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967),
“Skinner ’s transformation into a due process case about the right to marry
was complete.” Dubler, supra note 269, at 1373; see also Hill, supra note 270,
at 366 (“[Skinner] has been incorporated unofficially into substantive due process analysis as part of the privacy right elaborated years later in Griswold v.
Connecticut and its progeny.”).
272. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 134, at 1475 (arguing that Skinner does not
“embod[y] a fundamental right to reproductive autonomy” and that its “equal
protection language is no accident; to the contrary, it reveals the Supreme
Court’s longstanding concern for reproductive equality”); Goodwin, supra note
107, at 1089 (arguing that Skinner “says little about the importance or value
of reproduction or the right to reproduce”). Not all scholars agree with these
more constrained readings of Skinner. See Robertson, Assisting Reproduction,
supra note 122, at 1493 (arguing that “[a]lthough [Skinner] couched its decision in the language of equality . . . the rhetoric of a liberty right to reproduce
. . . explains the frequency with which the case is now cited”); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981,
1019 (1979).
273. Prior right to marry cases, including Loving v. Virginia and Zablocki
v. Redhail, either interwove equality and liberty or rested exclusively on the
Equal Protection Clause, leading some commentators to suggest that those
cases at most established that the Constitution guarantees “equal access” to
marriage, not that marriage is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe &
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right To Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1375 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right To Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081,
2083 (2005) (suggesting that the state could abolish marriage without violating due process). Obergefell, by contrast, is a persistent meditation on the
marriage “right.” Even as it clearly observes the equality dimension of marriage, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603–05 (2015), Obergefell in-
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fundamental rights terms. “[I]n Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson,” the majority states, “the Court invalidated under
both principles [liberty and equality] a law that allowed sterili274
zation of habitual criminals.” Like the marriage right, the
procreative right derives from the “independent principles” that
275
animate due process and equal protection. Moreover, like the
marriage right, the procreative right involves “both” liberty
276
“and” equality. Given that Obergefell refers to marriage and
procreation as “related rights” that compose a “unified
277
whole,” it is not implausible to conclude that Obergefell provides an opening for what some scholars see lacking in Skinner:
a robust articulation of procreation’s substantive constitutional
278
dimension.
If that is correct, then Obergefell unsettles arguments in
favor of alternative reproductive regulation that flow from reproductive binarism—specifically, arguments that assume that
Skinner protects, if anything, a more constrained equality right
in procreative decision-making rather than a more expansive
279
liberty right to reproduce. In a world where procreation is not

sists that “[t]he Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause . . . set
forth independent principles,” id. at 2603 (emphasis added), and that “[t]he
right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the
Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of
the equal protection of the laws,” id. at 2602 (emphasis added). The majority’s
use of the adverbial “too” suggests that marriage is protected as a matter of
substantive due process as well as equal protection. For a discussion of
Obergefell’s conceptualization of marriage in pure liberty terms, see Kenji
Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV.
147, 168 (2015).
274. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (emphasis added).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 2600.
278. In this sense, Obergefell conceptualizes procreation in terms reminiscent of Meyer v. Nebraska, a pre-Skinner case that similarly described behavior related to procreation—raising a family—in terms of liberty rather than of
equality. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating that the
term “liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment “denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, . . . to
marry, establish a home and bring up children . . . .”). Obergefell also conceptualizes procreation in terms reminiscent of Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, a
post-Skinner case that described procreation specifically in terms of liberty.
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (stating that the
“right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . encompasses
and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing” (emphasis added)).
279. See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
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protected under substantive due process, reproductive regulation that burdens all alternative procreators is of little constitutional moment. But in a world where procreation is a fundamental right, reproductive regulation that burdens any
alternative procreator raises serious constitutional concern.
As for the second issue, Obergefell establishes a strong basis for arguing that the Constitution protects alternative repro280
duction no less vigorously than it does sexual reproduction.
Obergefell states that non-traditional practices, like same-sex
marriage, may qualify for fundamental right status under the
Due Process Clause, notwithstanding the Court’s earlier insistence in Washington v. Glucksberg that “the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which
are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tra281
dition.’” Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion openly rejects
Glucksberg’s approach with respect to some fundamental
rights, including those relating to “marriage and intimacy,” and
282
refuses to define rights “by who exercised them in the past.”
“[R]ights come not from ancient sources alone,” the majority
avers. “They rise, too, from a better informed understanding of
how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains
283
urgent in our own era.”
In rejecting the traditional approach to determining rights
like marriage, Obergefell lays the foundation for establishing

280. To be sure, the Supreme Court arguably laid the groundwork for conceptualizing alternative procreation as a fundamental liberty right in Paris
Adult Theatre v. Slaton, where the Court not only recognized that the right to
privacy protected procreation, but also suggested that privacy (and therefore,
by implication, procreation) did not depend on any particular, localized conception of intimacy in order to receive robust constitutional protection. See
Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 66 n.13 (stating that “the constitutionally
protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate
relationship” and that “[s]uch protected privacy extends to the doctor’s office,
the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to
intimacy involved”). The Supreme Court thus provided support even before
Obergefell for the proposition that the Constitution protects (alternative) procreative relations between doctor and patient no less robustly than it protects
(sexually) procreative relations between spouses or unmarried sexual partners.
281. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (plurality opinion)).
282. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
283. Id.; see also Yoshino, supra note 273, at 162 (stating that “[a]fter
Obergefell, it will be much harder to invoke Glucksberg as binding precedent”
on the question of history’s role in determining fundamental rights).
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constitutional parity between (traditional) sexual reproduction
and (non-traditional) alternative reproduction. If marriage and
284
procreation are “related rights,” as Obergefell says, and if the
traditional approach for determining rights under the Due Process Clause does not apply to marriage, then it follows that the
traditional approach for determining rights probably does not
285
apply to procreation, either. If that is correct, then Obergefell
complicates reproductive regulation that flows from a belief
that alternative procreation is different from—and constitutionally inferior to—that of the conventional sexual variety.
B. THE DEVOLUTION OF SEX EXCEPTIONALISM
Much of the actual and proposed reproductive regulation
considered in Part I reflects a belief that sexual and alternative
reproduction are fundamentally distinct because one involves
sex and the other does not. Sexual and alternative reproduction
“are, in fact, different, and different enough to satisfy any level
286
of constitutional scrutiny,” Cahn writes. “[N]atural reproduction” and “clinical or assisted reproduction . . . are distinctly dif287
ferent,” Michele Goodwin asserts.
The foundational assumption that underlies these statements—that sex is unique and therefore merits different, and
often privileged, treatment—is factually misguided, as Part IV
demonstrated. But according to Supreme Court jurisprudence
on sex, marriage, and procreation, it is also constitutionally deficient, as that jurisprudence suggests that the constitutional
rights to sexual autonomy, marriage, and even procreation do
not—and cannot—turn on the question of whether one engages
in sex, narrowly and traditionally defined.
Consider the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which
established a right to sexual privacy that includes same-sex
288
couples. Lawrence found that criminal sodomy laws violated a
constitutionally protected right to non-coital, non-procreative
289
The Court there asserts that the Fourteenth
conduct.
Amendment prohibits the state from “defin[ing] the meaning of
284. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
285. Some scholars have suggested that Skinner does not establish a broad
right to procreate but rather is concerned with equality. See Rao, supra note
134, at 1475.
286. Cahn, Do Tell!, supra note 9, at 1106.
287. Goodwin, supra note 107, at 1091–92.
288. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
289. See id.
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290

[a sexual] relationship or to set its boundaries” —prohibits it,
that is, from codifying a particular vision of sex and intimacy in
291
the law. Where the Bowers v. Hardwick Court took offense at
the mere suggestion that “homosexual activity” existed on the
same constitutional plane as “family, marriage, [and] procrea292
tion,” Lawrence makes clear that the Constitution does not
require sex to look a certain way—does not require that it involve the union of specified body parts and specified sexes—in
order to receive constitutional protection. It repudiates the
Bowers Court’s requirement that sex amount to gender-specific
293
coitus in order to merit fundamental right status, and suggests that coitus was not a constitutional requirement even in
1986: “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not
294
correct today.”
Where Lawrence indicates that heterosexual coitus is no
longer a necessary condition to enjoy the right to sexual autonomy, Obergefell indicates that heterosexual coitus is no longer a
necessary condition to enjoy the right to marry—nor even, perhaps, the right to procreate. Obergefell explicitly rejects sex
exceptionalism in marriage by repudiating the procreation rationale for exclusionary marriage regimes. That rationale had
different iterations over the years, evolving from a procreation
as “propagation of the species” justification to the more recent
“responsible procreation” rationale discussed earlier. Each of
the procreation rationale’s versions, however, was driven by sex
exceptionalism and the sex/non-sex binary foregrounded by this
Article. When Baker v. Nelson, the first case to consider the
constitutionality of a same-sex marriage prohibition, upheld
that prohibition in 1971 by adverting to the procreation as
295
“propagation of the species” rationale, and throughout the
290. Id. at 567 (emphasis added).
291. But see Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of
Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 829 (2010) (arguing that “the Lawrence model
for protecting sexual conduct is problematic not only because it channels gay
sex into one marriage-like form, but also because it channels all sex into such
a form”).
292. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986), overruled by Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
293. The Lawrence Court criticized the Bowers v. Hardwick Court’s obsessive focus on the mechanics of the sex act at issue there, reasoning that the
intimate relationship, not the conduct that a relationship might entail, is the
proper focus of a constitutional inquiry. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
294. Id. at 578.
295. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting a federal constitutional challenge to Minnesota’s opposite-sex marriage requirement).
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heyday of that rationale over the next few decades, same-sex
couples were “propagating the species” through alternative ra297
When the procreation rationale
ther than sexual means.
eventually morphed into its “responsible procreation” version,
296. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. App. 1974)
(denying a marriage license to two men on the ground that “marriage exists as
a protected legal institution primarily because of societal values associated
with the propagation of the human race . . . [and] it is apparent that no samesex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their union”);
Hatcher v. Hatcher, 580 S.W.2d 475, 483 (Ark. 1979) (observing that
“[m]arriage is an important institution that is fundamental to our very existence and survival”); Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 1982)
(observing that same-sex marriage restrictions were constitutional because
“homosexual marriages never produce offspring”); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
297. See Bernstein, supra note 179, at 1060 (identifying a “shift in the
1940’s [sic] to popular use” of alternative insemination). Courts and legislators
in several states, including Minnesota, had been wrestling with issues surrounding alternative insemination for years before Baker was decided, and by
1973 the Uniform Law Commissioners had codified the trend toward legalization of alternative insemination through the passage of the Uniform Parentage
Act. See Bernstein, supra note 179, at 1069 n.125 (stating that “[s]everal bills
were also introduced in Minnesota in 1949” and that these bills “would have
made AI unlawful but would have legitimized the children”); Arthur A.
Levisohn, Dilemma in Parenthood: Socio-Legal Aspects of Human Artificial
Insemination, 4 J. FORENSIC MED. 147, 166 (1957). Other states considered
similar bills around the same time. See SWANSON, supra note 192, at 216 (discussing alternative insemination bills pending in Ohio and Minnesota); George
P. Smith, II, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the
Law, 67 MICH. L. REV. 127, 143 (1968) (referring to alternative insemination
bills pending in Indiana, New York, Virginia and Wisconsin between 1948 and
1950). In addition, by the 1980s, as courts continued to justify same-sex marriage exclusions on the ground that same-sex couples could not fulfill marriage’s central goal of helping to propagate the species, commercial “sperm
banks had become a common feature of the fertility landscape, with over 400
clinics in operation,” Gill, supra note 24, at 1721, and the commercial gamete
market began to cater to lesbian women in particular, with the country’s first
lesbian-owned sperm bank, Pacific Reproductive Services, opening for business in California in 1984. SWANSON, supra note 192, at 227 (observing a
1970s “movement by women without male partners to take charge of their reproduction through artificial insemination”); NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1197
(chronicling the “lesbian baby boom” of the 1980s and 1990s); Why a LesbianOwned Bank Is a Positive Choice for Any Woman, PAC. REPRO. SERVS., https://
www.pacrepro.com/index.php?main_page=why_prs (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
Alternative reproduction did not emerge as an explicit theme in marriage
equality jurisprudence until the 1995 decision Dean v. D.C., which located the
origins of the right to marry in sexual coitus specifically when it stated: “Although we recognize that gay and lesbian couples can and do have children
through adoption, surrogacy, and artificial insemination . . . we cannot overlook the fact that the Supreme Court has deemed marriage a fundamental
right substantially because of its relationship to procreation.” 653 A.2d 307,
333 (D.C. 1995).

2016]

REPRODUCTION RECONCEIVED

679

which posited a distinction between the “accidental” procreation of “natural” procreators (for whom marriage was necessary) and the “planned” procreation of “artificial” procreators
298
(for whom marriage was superfluous), courts’ reliance on the
sex/non-sex binary was more explicit. Either way, though,
same-sex couples were denied the ability to marry for half a
century because of the manner in which they procreated rather
than because of their inability to procreate. Put differently, sex
exceptionalism and a sex/non-sex binary justified—and drove—
exclusionary marriage regimes from the earliest days of constitutional litigation surrounding them.
Like so many of the marriage equality decisions that pre299
ceded it, Obergefell repudiates both sex exceptionalism and
the sex/non-sex binary by rejecting all versions of the procreation rationale for same-sex marriage prohibitions. Obergefell
barely pauses to consider that rationale in its various incarna298. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 24 (Ind. App. 2005); see also
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th. Cir. 2014) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting)
(summarizing and criticizing the responsible procreation rationale); Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 599 (Sup. Ct. 2005), rev’d, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005), aff ’d, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Standhardt v. Superior
Court, 77 P.3d 451, 463 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). The responsible procreation rationale had two variations. One version projected same-sex marriage in a positive light because of same-sex couples’ superior form of procreation. This was
the version of responsible procreation that first appeared in Standhardt v. Superior Court. The other version projected same-sex marriage in a negative
light because of its putative power to disrupt and diminish social norms surrounding marriage. According to it, same-sex marriage, by devaluing the inherent worth of traditional marriage, disincentivized opposite-sex couples to
enter into that relationship and incentivized them instead to procreate—
irresponsibly—outside of it. For decisions that rested on this second version of
responsible procreation, see Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1016 (D.
Nev. 2012), rev’d sub nom., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
Both versions denied same-sex couples the legal ability to marry because of
their inability to procreate in a certain manner—through sexual rather than
alternative means—rather than because of their inability to procreate at all.
299. See, e.g., Latta, 771 F.3d at 471 (rejecting all forms of the procreation
rationale and stating that Idaho’s responsible procreation argument “runs off
the rails” in claiming that “marriage’s stabilizing and unifying force is unnecessary for same-sex couples, because they always choose to conceive or adopt a
child”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1223 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that
it was “wholly illogical” to think that same-sex marriage would affect oppositesex couples’ procreative decision-making); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 662
(7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting responsible procreation as non-sensical); Bostic v.
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 385 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting all iterations of the procreation rationale); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012),
aff ’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921,
999–1000 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff ’d sub nom., Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2012), vacated sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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tions, as if to highlight its feebleness through near disregard.
In response to the states’ reliance on procreation as “propagation of the species,” the Court simply notes that “[a]n ability,
desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been a pre300
requisite for a valid marriage in any State.” Later, the Court
dismisses the states’ invocation of responsible procreation—the
fear that same-sex marriage will “lead[] to fewer opposite-sex
marriages” because it “severs the connection between natural
301
procreation and marriage” —as both “counterintuitive” and
302
In repudiating the procreation rationale,
“unrealistic.”
Obergefell indicates that the Constitution protects a fundamental right to marry that does not discriminate with respect to the
mechanics of procreation. While strongly signaling that procre303
ation might require marriage as a matter of social norms,
Obergefell rejects the inverse of that argument, namely that
marriage requires sexual procreation specifically as a matter of
constitutional law.
Where Lawrence thus rejects sex exceptionalism with respect to the right to sex, Obergefell rejects it with respect to the
right to marry. Even more, Obergefell and marriage equality
more generally might be read to reject sex exceptionalism with
respect to the right to procreate. As discussed earlier,
Obergefell more than once describes marriage and procreation
304
as “related rights” that compose a “unified whole.” If sex
exceptionalism and the sex/non-sex binary cannot satisfy infringements on the right to marry, then it follows that they
likely cannot satisfy infringements on the “related” right to
procreate, either.
By establishing that heterosexual intercourse and conventional understandings of intimacy are not the sine qua non of
sexual, marital, familial, and perhaps even procreative autonomy, Lawrence and Obergefell destabilize the panoply of existing and proposed regimes that rely on sex exceptionalism and
305
its narrow conception of sex and intimacy. Those regimes jus300. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
301. Id. at 2606–07.
302. Id. at 2607.
303. Id. at 2600 (stating that the children of unmarried same-sex couples
“suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents,
relegated through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life,” and justifying, in part, the Court’s decision to extend the marriage
right to same-sex couples on their children’s “suffer[ing]” and “humiliation”).
304. Id.
305. For the argument that Lawrence places constitutional limits around
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tify different treatment of sexual and alternative reproduction
by adverting to perceived differences between “intimate” heterosexual reproduction and “non-intimate” alternative reproduction—differences that Lawrence and Obergefell say are irrelevant when determining the scope of fundamental rights
relating to intimate and family life. In addition, those regimes
rely on and reinforce the same sex/non-sex binary that Lawrence and Obergefell clearly reject.
C. FAMILIAL DISESTABLISHMENT
The law’s sex/non-sex binary disciplines non-traditional
family formation. As such, it conflicts with the trend away from
sex exceptionalism in constitutional law, as the previous Section demonstrated. It also conflicts with a cognate jurisprudential trend: the trend toward familial disestablishment.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Supreme Court landmarks
306
307
like Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v.
308
309
Wade, and Moore v. City of East Cleveland disestablished
social and familial norms privileging the traditional family, defined as the sexually procreative nuclear family. More recently,
gay rights jurisprudence has broadened the reach of the principles animating those early cases. Lawrence extended Griswold
and Eisenstadt’s interrelated values of relational privacy and
non-procreative sex to non-coital sex between same-sex partners. Marriage equality jurisprudence extended those same
values to same-sex marriage and non-traditional family formation.
More specifically, marriage equality jurisprudence stands
not just for the relatively narrow proposition that the Constitugovernmental regulation of procreative conduct, see Abbasi, supra note 85, at
39; Katheryn D. Katz, Lawrence v. Texas: A Case for Cautious Optimism Regarding Procreative Liberty, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 249, 253 (2004).
306. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects a right to marital privacy that prohibits
the government from criminalizing married persons’ use of contraception).
307. 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from treating single persons and married persons differently with respect to their decisions to use contraception).
308. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause prohibits the government from infringing on a woman’s right
to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy).
309. 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the state from passing restrictive housing laws that “slic[e] deeply into the [biological] family itself ”).
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tion protects a fundamental right to marry that includes samesex marriage, but also for the broader principle that the Constitution prohibits the state from establishing a particular vision
310
of kinship to which its citizens must conform. In Kitchen v.
311
Herbert, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit embraced
the familial disestablishment principle when it held that exclusionary marriage laws violated an individual’s constitutionally
guaranteed rights to marry and “establish” the kind of “family”
312
she desired. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court embraced that
principle when it recognized the vigorous protection that the
Fourteenth Amendment extends to “choices concerning . . . fam313
ily relationships.” Far from protecting just same-sex marriage, then, the marriage equality precedent safeguards familial choice and association, “cast[ing] serious doubt . . . on specific
efforts to limit opportunities for same-sex couples to form fami314
lies.” That precedent furthers a trend “toward a thinner form
of establishment, if not disestablishment,” in the law of mar315
riage as well as in the law of the family writ large.
Familial disestablishment jurisprudence unsettles the actual and proposed reproductive regulation considered in Part I,
including the judicial and legislative refusal to view sex as just
another form of alternative reproduction. The law declines to
recognize a category of “artificial insemination by inter316
course,” reasoning that the “distinction between reproduction
310. For the argument that contemporary marriage equality jurisprudence
stands for an expansive right to familial self-definition, see Cahill, Oedipus
Hex, supra note 2, at 246–49; Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality:
The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014); NeJaime,
supra note 5, at 1231 (arguing that “marriage equality may facilitate, rather
than disrupt, the new model of parenthood built in earlier nonmarital work”).
311. 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
312. Id. at 1199 (holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental right to marry, establish a family, raise children, and enjoy the
full protection of a state’s marital laws”).
313. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015). The Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor paved the way for the constitutional parity
that Obergefell establishes between same-sex and opposite-sex families with
regard to familial choice. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694
(2013) (criticizing the Defense of Marriage Act in part because it “makes it
even more difficult for the children [of same-sex couples] to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families
in their community and in their daily lives” (emphasis added)).
314. NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1255.
315. Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119
YALE L.J. 1236, 1270 (2010).
316. Kesler v. Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
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via sexual intercourse and the non-sexual clinical options for
317
conception” is “commonsense.” In so doing, it uses sex as a
proxy for intimacy, thereby establishing an idealized vision of
sex. Moreover, it imposes biological fatherhood in situations
where it is unwanted, thereby establishing an idealized vision
318
of biological, dual-gender parenthood.
In addition, familial disestablishment jurisprudence upsets
regulatory regimes that rely on the sex/non-sex binary to establish the traditional family. Some of those regimes use the
sex/non-sex binary to entrench the traditional nuclear family
for overtly ideological reasons. For example, David
Blankenhorn asserts a distinction between procreation the “oldfashioned way” and procreation the “intentional” way in order
to justify alternative reproductive regulation that privileges bi319
ology over other forms of connection and affiliation. Others
use that binary in more subtle ways to channel individuals into
thinking about the family according to a traditional paradigm
of it. For example, Cahn invokes the binary to justify the regulation of alternative reproduction—by eliminating sperm donor
320
anonymity, for instance, and by requiring sperm donors to
321
register with a sperm donor registry —in ways that force
those who rely on sperm donors to conceptualize them in famil322
ial terms. Whether transparently ideological or not, all of
these regimes are in serious tension with constitutional law’s
interrelated values of familial autonomy and disestablishment.
Not only do they frustrate individuals’ efforts “to establish” the
317. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1245 (Pa. 2007).
318. See Polikoff, supra note 126, at 59, 62 (urging the law to move “towards [allowing] . . . all women to raise a child without a legal father,” should
they so desire, and arguing that forced paternity in cases where women do not
want it reinforces the message that “children’s families will be incomplete
without a man”).
319. Marquardt, supra note 8, at 23. For a longer discussion of how alternative reproduction has become the new resting place for Blankenhorn’s longstanding anxiety over non-traditional family formation, see Cahill, Oedipus
Hex, supra note 2, passim.
320. For the argument that anonymous gamete donation could lead to accidental incest, see Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line – or the
Curtain? – for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59 (2009).
321. For the argument that the federal government ought to establish national gamete donor registries, see Naomi Cahn, Necessary Subjects: The Need
for a Mandatory National Donor Gamete Databank, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 203, 203–06 (2009); Cahn, The New Kinship, supra note 104, at 6.
322. For an elaboration of how Cahn’s (and others’) arguments favoring
greater regulation of alternative reproduction raise familial establishment
concerns, see Cahill, Oedipus Hex, supra note 2, at 226–37.
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family that they want, but they also simultaneously reinforce
and solidify a normative conception of kinship.
D. PROCREATIVE INTENTIONALITY AND PURPOSEFUL
PARENTHOOD
Reproductive binarism privileges the manner of procreation over the intentions of the procreative parties. As such, it
frustrates constitutional norms favoring intention as the foundation of parental and familial rights. For more than fifty
years, constitutional law has recognized the values of private
ordering and procreative intentionality in shaping rights relat323
ing to privacy, procreation, and the family. Recent constitutional decisions on marriage and the family endorse and reaffirm those same values.
In an article on the synergistic relationship between family
324
law and marriage equality jurisprudence, Douglas NeJaime
argues that Obergefell vindicates the “intentional parenthood
principle” that emerged from family law advocacy on behalf of
intentional—and often non-biological—parents starting in the
325
1990s. Contesting the view that marriage equality represents
326
a dramatic departure from that advocacy, NeJaime contends
that “marriage equality was partly enabled by—and in turn
enables—intentional and functional concepts of parenthood
327
forged in earlier nonmarital [family law] advocacy.” Under
this view, marriage equality reflects, channels, and solidifies
the model of intentional procreation and parenthood that mate323. See Shultz, supra note 200, at 327–28, 327 n.82 (stating that “[o]ur
society generally favors the fulfillment of individual purposes and the amplification of individual choice. . . . Our political and cultural traditions emphasize
individual liberty, particularly in central arenas of personal life, such as reproduction,” and citing Skinner, Griswold, and Roe in support of that proposition).
324. NeJaime, supra note 5.
325. Id. at 1200, 1249. Family law’s emphasis on intention as the basis for
legal rights, rather than on traditional indicia of legal parenthood like biology,
gender, and marriage, has been widely observed and amply documented. See,
e.g., Ian Ayres, Empire or Residue: Competing Visions of the Contractual Canon, 26 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 897 (1999); Ertman, supra note 167, at 81–82; Hill,
supra note 270, at 386 (“[D]efending an ‘intentionalist’ account of the right of
procreation . . . .”); Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 97, at 429; Jana
B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443; Richard
F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002).
326. See NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1231–36 (summarizing these arguments).
327. Id. at 1236.

2016]

REPRODUCTION RECONCEIVED

685

328

rialized over decades of LGBT family law work. Like the body
of family law that paved its way, marriage equality prioritizes
function and intent over traditional indicia of parenthood like
biology, sexual orientation, and even marriage itself.
By valuing procreative form over procreative intent, reproductive binarism undermines constitutional law’s prioritizing of
private ordering in procreative and familial affairs. Laws that
regulate the practices of alternative reproduction, including
mandatory non-anonymity laws and mandatory donor registries, frustrate procreative and familial intent by imposing a
particular image of family—biological paternity—on those who
might want to define family in less-traditional ways. Judicial
decisions that void sexual insemination contracts on public policy grounds do so as well, privileging as they do reproductive
acts over reproductive intentions.
V. REPRODUCTION BY INTENT
What would the law look like in a world where legal relationships and reproductive practices did not turn so heavily on
a factually incoherent and constitutionally questionable
sex/non-sex binary? The primary objectives of this Article have
been to illuminate the pervasive presence of that binary in the
law and to challenge it from a factual/formal and constitutional
perspective. For that reason, this Part only briefly—and tentatively—answers the question posed above.
Section A proposes a unitary model of reproductive regulation grounded in intent and argues that that model ought to
guide the regulation of sexual and alternative reproduction
alike. The current approach to reproductive regulation centers
on criteria—like intimacy, sex, deliberation, control, chance,
artfulness, and naturalness—that are vague, equivocal, and
misleading; they are also normatively undesirable and constitutionally questionable in light of existing and emerging constitutional norms relating to sex, marriage, procreation, and family formation. A new model that better comports with those
norms is needed, and Section A offers one. Section B anticipates and responds to objections to the model put forth in Section A.
328. According to NeJaime, marriage equality has also enabled intentional
parenthood in some states, like Florida and Iowa, where courts have invoked
the marriage equality precedent in support of intentional same-sex family
formation. See id. at 1246–47, 1256–58 (discussing Iowa and Florida, respectively).
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A. TOWARD AN INTENT-BASED MODEL OF REPRODUCTION
This Article favors a unitary system of reproductive regulation that turns on intent rather than on procreative mechanics
and on unreliable (and constitutionally questionable) criteria
like sex and intimacy. Other scholars support similar treatment of sexual and alternative reproduction, although not for
329
all of the reasons and in the ways identified here. For some,
the similarities between sexual and alternative reproduction
militate in favor of less state intervention in alternative reproduction. For others, those similarities support greater, not lesser, regulation of it.
For instance, arguing that “like cases” ought to receive
330
“like treatment,” Marsha Garrison proposes that the law prohibit anonymous sperm donation in cases involving women who
are not married to someone with whom they intend to raise a
child that results from that donation. Such women would include single women and perhaps also lesbian couples, whether
331
married or not. “[O]utside the [alternative insemination by
329. See, e.g., ERTMAN, supra note 125, at xiv–xv (discussing similarities
between “Plan A” and “Plan B” parenthood in terms of procreative intention);
Appleton, supra note 50, at 111 (asking whether parentage law’s “sex/no sex
dividing line” warrants reconsideration in light of the “natural insemination”
movement and of the growing number of non-traditional procreators who seek
to create family through alternative means); NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1253
(stating that marriage equality “presents a challenge to family law regulations
that continue to draw distinctions between families formed by different-sex
and same-sex couples”); Polikoff, supra note 126, at 59 (supporting the creation of families through sexual and non-sexual means); Robertson, Procreative
Liberty, supra note 97, at 428 (favoring parity of treatment between sexual
and alternative reproduction because of the similar interests involved in each).
None of these commentators situates, as this Article does, different treatment
of sexual and alternative reproduction within the larger context of the law’s
sex/non-sex binary. Nor does any consider why maintaining that binary—in all
of the ways that the law does—makes little sense as a factual matter and is
likely unconstitutional in light of existing and emerging constitutional norms
relating to sex, marriage, procreation, and family formation.
330. Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 879. Garrison posits that “[t]he law has never cared whether sperm and ovum met in a
fallopian tube or in the uterus; there is no obvious reason why it should care if
sperm and ovum meet in a petri dish. What matters are the relational interests that ultimately result.” Id. at 880.
331. See id. at 896–97 (supporting anonymous donation in cases involving
married women and their husbands, so long as their husbands consent); id. at
903 (opposing anonymous donation in cases involving single women). Because
Garrison wrote her article before same-sex marriage was legally recognized in
any U.S. jurisdiction, it is hard to say whether she would support anonymous
donation in cases involving women married to other women, where the “parental presumption” might apply. On the application of the presumption in that
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donor] context,” she says, “our legal system grants no parent,
332
male or female, the right to be a sole parent.” “[T]here is no
obvious reason why paternity laws should mandate different
results when women conceive using [alternative insemination
333
by donor] and when women conceive sexually.”
Like Garrison, this Article contends that sexual and alternative reproduction are alike in ways that demand “like treatment.” Unlike Garrison, however, it does not favor importing
the rules that currently govern sexual conception—including
the universal rules that disallow paternity waivers—into the
alternative reproductive context in order to achieve that result.
Moving toward a unitary system of reproductive regulation in
this way is ill-advised for two reasons.
First, applying the rules of sexual conception to alternative
reproduction, thereby not only eliminating sperm donor anonymity but also mandating paternity for sperm donors who donate to unmarried women, will never achieve the parity that
Garrison imagines. To the contrary, such a regime will significantly curtail the reproductive autonomy of alternative procreators in ways, and for reasons, that are normatively undesirable.
To see why that is so, consider that the law cannot force an
unmarried woman who conceives with a man sexually to reveal
that man’s identity; Garrison herself acknowledges as much:
“[C]ontemporary family law strongly encourages unmarried
women to establish the paternity of their children, but does not
334
mandate it.” A not insignificant percentage of unmarried
women either cannot, or do not want to, identify their child’s
father, as evidenced by studies on the number of unmarried
women—a group that accounted for nearly forty-one percent of
335
all live births in 2013 —who do not seek child support from
context, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227
(2006); NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1240–49. At times Garrison appears to reject
anonymous donation even for single women who plan to raise a child with an
unmarried female partner. Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making, supra
note 104, at 910. At other times, however, Garrison suggests that she would
support anonymous donation for lesbians, so long as they are married and can
satisfy family law’s two-parent ideal. See id. at 911 n.340.
332. Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 906.
333. Id. at 903.
334. Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
335. Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2013, NAT’L VITAL STAT.
REP., Jan. 15, 2015, at 2 http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_01
.pdf.
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the father, even in cases where federal law requires them to do
336
so. While known paternity might exist in most sexual conception cases, it does not exist in some of them.
Mandating legal paternity—and not just non-anonymity—
in the alternative insemination context, therefore, would not
establish parity between alternative reproduction and sexual
conception as the latter actually exists. Rather, doing so would
curtail the reproductive autonomy of alternative procreators in
order to achieve parity between alternative reproduction and
sexual conception as the latter should ideally exist, according to
337
some.
A second reason why Garrison’s recommendation is illadvised relates to the law’s shift toward intent-based parent336. See, e.g., SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN: WOMEN IN THE
AGE OF WELFARE REFORM 79–82 (2003) (discussing unmarried women’s reluctance or inability to identify their child’s father, even though federal law requires them to do so in order to receive government support); Garrison, Law
Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 911–12.
337. See Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, supra note 14,
at 32 (arguing that “it seems unfairly burdensome to impose a standard of
two-biological-parent families for children conceived through [alternative insemination] that is not imposed on parents who conceive coitally”). In this
sense, Garrison’s proposal to require paternity in a large subset of alternative
reproduction cases represents a normatively and constitutionally problematic
example of what I have elsewhere termed “regulating at the margins.” See
Courtney Megan Cahill, Regulating at the Margins: Non-Traditional Kinship
and the Legal Regulation of Intimate and Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 43, 43
(2012). Regulating at the margins occurs, I argue, when the law uses a marginal kinship practice like same-sex marriage or alternative reproduction as
an occasion to imagine what the ideal family ought to look like for everyone.
Id. at 57. The procreation rationale for exclusionary marriage laws was a problematic—and, according to the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, unconstitutional—example of “regulating at the margins” because it subjected samesex couples to a normative ideal, procreative marriage, from which oppositesex couples were completely exempt. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2606–07 (2015) (rejecting
the procreation rationale for exclusionary marriage laws). As with same-sex
marriage prohibitions, laws that require paternity—or simply eliminate gamete donor anonymity—for all donor-conceived persons are a constitutionally
deficient example of regulating at the margins, as such laws impose a normative ideal on alternative procreators that cannot be universally imposed on
sexual procreators. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Universalizing Anonymity
Anxiety, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES (forthcoming 2016) (discussing proposals to eliminate gamete donor anonymity as constitutionally problematic attempts to
regulate all procreation “at the margins”). Garrison herself recognizes that her
proposal selectively targets alternative procreators in this manner. See Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making, supra note 104, at 912 (observing that “[i]t
is true that public policy tolerates unmarried women’s failure to establish the
paternity of sexually conceived children largely because it is powerless to do
anything about it. [Alternative insemination by donor] offers a context in
which dual parenting could far more reliably be enforced” (emphasis added)).
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hood. As Martha Ertman observes in her critique of Garrison’s
proposal, Garrison appears to favor the conventional nuclear
338
family and “majoritarian beliefs” rather than private ordering
339
and intent as guiding principles for family law. Indeed, Garrison’s antidote to reproductive binarism perpetuates many of
the problems of reproductive binarism discussed earlier, including its tendency to undermine the norms and values that have
emerged from the law’s engagement with the family and its
radical transformation over the last several decades—norms
and values like procreative freedom, sexual disestablishment,
familial disestablishment, familial pluralism, and procreative/parental intentionality.
This Article argues that intent, rather than majoritarian
values or reproductive mechanics, ought to serve as the law’s
principal guide when operationalizing a unitary system of reproductive regulation. Even as this Article recognizes that sexual and alternative reproduction are formally similar in ways
that demand equal treatment, it also argues that intent ought
ultimately to guide the regulation of all reproduction, regardless of the form that it assumes.
A unitary system of reproductive regulation grounded in
intent would render many of the proposed regulations of alternative reproduction considered earlier legally questionable. If
alternative procreators are subject to regulations that abolish a
key industry norm—anonymity—then there is little reason to
340
exempt sexual procreators from those same regulations. Similarly, a unitary system of reproductive regulation would cast
doubt on proposals to punish gamete banks for organizing donors in race-salient ways—by, for instance, permitting users of
those banks’ websites to easily filter (and therefore eliminate)
341
prospective donors on the basis of their race. “If we scrutinize
white single mothers’ selection of white sperm donors, we
should also critique white men who choose to marry white
women,” Ertman writes. “If this level of meddling seems ridicu-

338. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, supra note 14, at
38–39 (including Garrison among commentators who do not “agree that private decision-making is appropriate to determine who can become a parent”).
339. Id.
340. For an elaboration of this argument, see Cahill, Oedipus Hex, supra
note 2, at 211–12; see also Cohen, supra note 125, at 443.
341. See Fox, Racial Classification, supra note 103, at 1852–55 (discussing
race-conscious donor catalogs).
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lous, it is hard to see how it is appropriate when the insemina342
tion occurs technologically rather than coitally.”
In addition, a unitary system of reproductive regulation
would require re-evaluating actual regulations of alternative
reproduction, including FDA regulations that exempt donations
between “sexually intimate” partners from its mandatory testing requirements. Such regulations rest on criteria, like sex
and intimacy, which are an unstable and constitutionally questionable basis for reproductive regulation. If the law exempts
sexually intimate partners from mandatory testing—as it does,
whether they are procreating through alternative or sexual
means—then it ought also to exempt procreative partners who
are “intimate” in other ways, like Trent Arsenault and the
women who sought his services.
Finally, a unitary system of reproductive regulation would
necessitate a second look at the law’s deeply rooted public policy against sexual conception agreements and at the continued
statutory refusal to define sex as a form of assisted reproduction. If the law permits paternity waivers in the alternative reproductive context, then it ought to permit them as well in the
sexual reproductive context, at least where the parties have a
duly executed contract to that effect. The judicial and legislative repudiation of a category of “artificial insemination by intercourse” fails to comport with the lived experience of sexual
and alternative reproduction—as well as with the constitutional law that protects both. It fails to reflect the reality that sexual and alternative reproduction are similar in essential ways,
and that the latter takes place under conditions of intimacy at
least as often as the former does not. Moreover, it fails to comport with the disestablishment and autonomy norms that constitutional law robustly protects.
B. ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS
This Section briefly anticipates—and responds to—three
objections to the regulatory scheme envisioned above: (1) objections relating to health and safety; (2) objections relating to
sexual conception contracts; and (3) objections relating to unintended consequences on paternity.

342. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market?, supra note 14, at
30.
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1. Objections Relating to Health and Safety
One objection to moving toward a more unitary system of
reproductive regulation relates to health and safety: failure to
regulate alternative reproduction by imposing caps on donation
and eliminating anonymous donation could lead to health epidemics—should a single donor with a deleterious condition pass
it on to hundreds of progeny—as well as to “accidental incest”
343
between unsuspecting donor-conceived children. No less concerning are the consequences of expanding the FDA’s definition
of “sexually intimate” partners to encompass a larger swath of
procreative partners who do not conform to the government’s
normative view of sexual intimacy—and who therefore can
evade the FDA’s mandatory testing requirements for a host of
transmissible diseases.
These objections are empirically weak—how likely is it
that donor-conceived children will “commit” accidental in344
cest? —but they also fail to reckon with the fact that the risk
of any of those misfortunes happening is significantly greater
in the sexual reproductive context than it is in the one which
345
regulators are targeting. This is not to say that gamete banks
cannot impose their own caps on donation—some of them
346
do —or prohibit anonymous donation in order to avoid the
above-mentioned threats should they see a need to. Rather, it is
simply to point out the problems with the argument that governmental regulation of one form of reproduction (alternative)
is absolutely required in order to avert the same evils to which
another unregulated form of reproduction (sexual) could also
lead.
2. Objections Relating to Sexual Conception Contracts
A second objection to the unitary system that this Article
envisions relates to sexual conception contracts and their supposed untrustworthiness and moral unsavoriness. Some might
argue that public policy militates against legal recognition of
such contracts, which is the status quo today, for good reason:
343. See CAHN, THE NEW KINSHIP, supra note 104, at 117; Cahn, supra
note 320, passim.
344. See Cahill, Oedipus Hex, supra note 2, at 208.
345. See id. at 211–12.
346. See, e.g., Cryobank Regulations and Statistics, NW CRYOBANK, https://
www.nwcryobank.com/cryobank-regulations-and-statistics (last visited Nov. 3,
2016) (establishing a limit of twenty-five family units, or “children from the
same donor living in the same home,” per donor).
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contractual intent is unreliable when a contract involves sex,
parents cannot bargain away their children’s support, and contracts whose consideration is sex are morally distasteful and
invariably void. Each of these objections fails as a persuasive
argument against legal recognition of sexual conception contracts and paternity waivers.
a. Contractual Intent Is Unreliable in Sexual Agreements
The argument that contractual intent is unreliable when
the contract involves sex assumes that persons who enter into
sexual conception contracts are “intimates” in an “ongoing rela347
tionship[].” Many of the people who participate in the natural
insemination “movement,” however, might be near (or com348
plete) strangers. In addition, the argument that consent can
never be adequately guaranteed when an agreement involves
sex reflects the questionable logic of sex exceptionalism. That
logic contemplates contractual autonomy in most other domains but not in the sexual domain, thereby giving the state,
rather than the parties themselves, the power “to place [its]
349
valuation[] on particular deals.” Finally, on a more practical
level, that argument overlooks the possibility that the state
could require the parties to a sexual conception agreement to
follow certain formalities in order to validate it. For instance,
jurisdictions might require both parties to be represented by
counsel when entering into sexual conception agreements, as
many do in the context of prenuptial, surrogacy, and embryo
350
agreements. “Foremost” among the reasons why the Indiana
court in In re Paternity of M.F. upheld the donor insemination
agreement at issue there was the fact that it was “prepared by
351
an attorney.” Such agreements could also be subject to periodic review, as prenuptial agreements often are.
b. Parents Cannot Bargain Away the Rights of Their Children
The argument that sexual conception agreements are void
because parents cannot bargain away the rights of their chil347. Shultz, supra note 200, at 324.
348. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
349. Emens, supra note 7, at 356.
350. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (stating that if
“[e]xplicit agreements avoid costly litigation in business transactions. . . . They
are all the more necessary and desirable in personal matters of reproductive
choice, where the intangible costs of any litigation are simply incalculable”).
351. In re Paternity of M.F., 938 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
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dren, financial or otherwise, confuses two sets of cases: one
where men attempt to contract out of paternity before sex and
one where men attempt to contract out of child support obligations after a child has come into being. Men who enter into sexual conception contracts belong to the first, not the second, category, even as courts often casually confuse the boundaries
352
between the two. Indeed, the whole point of a sexual conception contract is to allow men to avoid paternity in the first
place, not to opt out of paternity, already established.
In addition, the argument that the law ought to prohibit
sexual conception agreements because they leave a child with
only one source of financial support is both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because, in some cases, two
persons might be the intended parents of a child who is sexually conceived with a third party. It is under-inclusive because
the law in many jurisdictions does not prohibit single women
353
from conceiving with a donor who waives paternity.
Finally, the argument that sexual conception contracts
wrongfully absolve sexual conceivers of their financial responsibilities assumes that forced fatherhood, whether a man intentionally or accidentally conceives, is a worthy objective. Some
philosophers and sociologists disagree, questioning whether the
law ought to impose paternal obligations on men who do not
want them. They argue that coerced paternity fails to respect
autonomy by forcing a relationship and its attendant responsi354
bilities on a person who wishes to avoid that status. It could
also lead “to painful ‘disestablishment’ battles that are unlikely
355
to be in the best interest of the child” and to “violence or
threats of violence against a mother . . . when child support or356
ders are enforced against” unwilling men. Even if we reject

352. See Kesler v. Weniger, 744 A.2d 794, 796 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (analogizing the sexual insemination contract at issue in that case to situations
where fathers have attempted to contract out of child support obligations after
a child has come into being and refusing to uphold the contract for that reason); Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597, 599–600 (Ind. 1994) (same).
353. See Appleton, supra note 50, at 99–101.
354. See, e.g., Elizabeth Brake, Fatherhood and Child Support: Do Men
Have a Right To Choose?, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 55 passim (2005); Laurie
Shrage, Is Forced Fatherhood Fair?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (June 12,
2013), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/is-forced-fatherhood
-fair/?_r=0.
355. Shrage, supra note 354.
356. Id.; see also HAYS, supra note 336, at 82 (documenting instances
where women applying for financial assistance did not want to reveal a possi-
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the extreme result of these positions—non-paternity for accidental fathers—it is harder to reject non-paternity in the case
of the man who contracts out of parenthood ex ante. If we worry about autonomy violations when the law imposes paternity
on men who become fathers by accident, then we ought to worry about them significantly more when the law imposes paternity on men who contract out of paternity before sex.
c. The Law Disfavors Sexual Consideration
The argument that sexual conception contracts are void because “sexual intercourse as consideration is itself against pub357
lic policy” assumes that sex is the consideration underlying
the agreement. But consideration for an agreement to exchange
sperm through sexual coitus in return for a waiver of parental
rights (and responsibilities) is the sperm (and concomitant
waiver of paternity), not the sex act that transmits the sperm.
Indeed, even if sex were part of the consideration, the law generally permits severing of the sexual aspects of a contract from
its non-sexual terms. In Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme Court held that cohabitation contracts were valid in California “unless expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit
358
consideration of sexual services.” In other words, Marvin
permits “sever[ing] ‘meretricious’ (or sexual) consideration from
359
other contract terms,” which is possible in the context of sexual conception agreements. Finally, even if severing were not
possible in the sexual conception setting, one could argue that
the law’s refusal to recognize sexual consideration in this setting represents yet another problematic example of sex
360
exceptionalism and the law’s “distaste for sex.”
3. Objections Relating to Unintended Consequences on
Paternity
A final objection to a unitary system of reproductive regulation based on intent relates to its unintended consequences
on paternity. Years ago, conservative commentators worried
that “no strings attached” sperm donation would have a negative effect on fatherhood by reducing men to reproductive mateble father’s name, as federal law requires, in part because of a fear of violence
against them).
357. Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Ind. 1994).
358. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114 (Cal. 1976) (en banc).
359. Appleton, supra note 50, at 114.
360. Id.
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rial and thereby making all fathers seem dispensable. Under
this view, anonymous sperm donation (the marginal case)
would have the unintended consequence of creating irresponsi362
ble fathers more generally (the general case).
One response to this fear is that there is simply no evidence that sperm donation—or alternative reproduction generally—has devalued parenthood for everyone. In fact, this objection is reminiscent of one version of the procreation rationale
rejected by the Supreme Court in Obergefell, namely the argument that same-sex marriage would devalue marital
parenthood for heterosexual couples and thereby disincentivize
363
them from entering that institution. The same-sex marriage
“parade of horribles” never materialized. Quite the opposite: af364
ter Massachusetts recognized same-sex marriage in 2003,
365
marriage rates increased, not decreased, in that state, and
divorce rates were lowest in states that recognized same-sex
366
marriage before Obergefell.
In addition, were the law to recognize sexual conception
agreements, it is unlikely that a sizeable percentage of people
would opt into them. The Centers for Disease Control estimates
that less than two percent of all live births in the United States
in 2013 were attributable to alternative reproductive technology, which includes, but is not limited to, alternative insemina367
tion. Figures on natural insemination as a form of alternative
361. See, e.g., BLANKENHORN, supra note 104, at 16 (arguing that “fatherhood as anonymous insemination” is contributing to “decultured paternity,”
which “necessarily fractures any coherent social understanding of fatherhood”).
362. Id. at 184 (arguing that sperm fatherhood is a “means of paternal suicide: the collaboration of the male in the eradication of his fatherhood”).
363. See, e.g., Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1016 (D. Nev. 2012),
rev’d sub nom., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 471 (9th Cir. 2014).
364. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003)
(finding that same-sex marriage was constitutionally required under Massachusetts’ constitution).
365. Carlos Maza, 10 Years Later, Horror Stories About Marriage Equality
in Massachusetts Haven’t Come True, EQUALITYMATTERS (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://equalitymatters.org/blog/201311190003.
366. See Nate Silver, Divorce Rates Higher in States with Gay Marriage
Bans, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 12, 2010), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
divorce-rates-appear-higher-in-states.
367. NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, 2013 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT 7 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/art/pdf/2013-report/art_2013_national_
summary_report.pdf. These figures are likely not perfect, as the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) does not impose any robust sanctions
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reproduction do not exist, but the actual numbers are likely to
be significantly lower than two percent. Less—significantly
less—than two percent is unlikely to have a sizeable enough
impact on social norms around parenthood and fatherhood to
shift those institutions in undesirable ways.
CONCLUSION
The law’s sex/non-sex binary is an equal opportunity regulator, affecting everyone and disciplining many: gays no less
than straights, singles no less than the partnered, the fertile no
less than the infertile. It reaches into the most private of domains—procreation and family formation—and governs relationships that ordinarily receive vigorous constitutional protection. It is persistent and commands popular support: while no
longer a valid basis for marriage discrimination against samesex couples, reproductive binarism has emerged as a major
player for both conservatives and progressives in debates over
whether, why, and to what extent the law ought to regulate the
practices of alternative reproduction and non-traditional family
formation. Finally, its scope is vast, if at times invisible, affecting everything from paternity determinations to the regulation
of gamete banks under federal law. Indeed, few questions are
more important when approaching an issue of reproductive
regulation than whether the subject of that regulation does, or
does not, involve sex in some way—however remote.
Notwithstanding its power to regulate intimate relationships far and wide, the sustainability of the sex/non-sex binary
is uncertain. Barely a year into its life, Obergefell v. Hodges has
prompted scholars to consider the larger implications of a marriage equality precedent on alternative reproduction and on
family law more generally. Tantalizing in this regard is Douglas NeJaime’s suggestion that “marriage equality [may produce] more pluralistic family law” for all families by
“accelerat[ing] the slippage between marital and nonmarital

on clinics that do not provide data to the CDC showing IVF success rates, even
as the CDC has technically “required” clinics to provide that information since
1992, when Congress passed the only federal “statute dealing specifically with
assisted reproduction, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act.”
GREELY, supra note 15, at 154–55. The only “sanction” imposed on nonreporting clinics is a published report by the CDC listing “the names of the
scofflaws,” which, according to the CDC’s 2012 report, the most recent report
available, amounts to thirty clinics nationwide. Id. at 155.
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parentage” in ways that “yield more robust recognition for some
368
unmarried parents.”
NeJaime’s “slippage” metaphor invites reflection on whether marriage equality will also accelerate other kinds of slippages, including the one between sexual and alternative reproduction foregrounded by this Article. As a factual matter, slippage
369
between those two so-called “extremes” is already occurring—
and has been for some time now—given the growing similarities between sexual and alternative reproduction. Sexual reproduction is always “assisted,” alternative reproduction is occasionally sexual, and sexual and alternative reproduction are
sometimes the same thing. The “slippage” that this Article anticipates—and advocates—is therefore not one of fact but rather one of law: the slippage between sexual and alternative
reproductive regulation.
This Article has built a case for why legal slippage between
those two variables is normatively desirable: the law’s current
system of reproductive regulation is grounded in criteria, like
intimacy, that are vague, imprecise, and just as easily applicable to one form of reproduction as to another. It has also argued
that regulatory slippage is likely inevitable: existing and
emerging constitutional norms surrounding sex, intimacy, marriage and procreation ought to make it harder for the law to
maintain a sex/non-sex binary that turns on sex exceptionalism
and intimacy essentialism. What that slippage will, or could,
look like in practical terms remains to be seen. This Article has
offered one possibility, but its primary purpose has been to
stimulate critical engagement with a binary that no longer
comports with the lived reality of procreation as it exists for
many people, or with the law that increasingly protects it.

368. NeJaime, supra note 5, at 1253.
369. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1246 (Pa. 2007) (describing
sexual and alternative reproduction as two “extremes” on a reproductive continuum).

